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"Another observation. It never happens that the unconscious work gives us the result of a
somewhat long calculation all made, where we have only to apply xed rules. [...] The rules of
these calculations are strict and complicated. They require discipline, attention, will, and
therefore consciousness. In the subliminal self, on the contrary, reigns what I should call liberty,
if we might give this name to the simple absence of discipline and to the disorder born of
chance. Only, this disorder itself permits unexpected combinations." - H.Poincaré.
I. Statement
The word 'consciousness' may refer to multiple realities: while some theoricians think of
it as the fact for a physical system to have phenomenal experience and search to explain why
certain physical systems have experience and others do not, others focus more on the relation
of the subject of phenomenal experience to this experience, and explain consciousness by what
happens in the brain when some information becomes conscious. Others think of consciousness
in terms of attribution of phenomenal experience to another physical system in the subject's
own experience. The multiple aspects of consciousness dier in the possibility and diculty of
analysis, however the easiest way is not necessarily the most meaningful. My point of view on this
is that thinking about consciousness through some reading grid which allows the progression from
a description of simple but fundamental aspects of it to a complexication into a more detailed
description and analysis might end with unexpected insight into other aspects of consciousness
that are more dicult to approach and a priori out of reach. This is why when thinking about
consciousness I choose to focus on what I shall call the experiencing subject, meaning the subject
in its activity on and in its phenomenal experience, in which it navigates, that it conceptualises,
from which it extracts information, and uses it to transform this experience (a priori this list is
not exhaustive but should give an idea of what I am talking about). From this point of view, one
may conceive other aspects consciousness such as that the degree of consciousness of a subject
which should be related to the 'richness' of the conceptualisation of experience (constructed out
of the execution of a certain series of transcendental operations). Describing the structure of the
possible dynamics of the experiencing subject, in other words the form of the subject's relation
to its experience - which as such participates to the concept of consciousness as such, as it is not
specic to any experience in particular - may allow a correspondance of this structure with the
structure of the humain brain, which should be expected to be partial. Furthermore in order for
this correspondance to be possible, the description should come with a conceptualisation of this
structure, an understanding of it.
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The purpose of this article is not to present a theory of consciousness for which the author
could enter the competition for attention and fundings; instead it appears to me that the right way
to conceptualise consciousness is not clear yet and that it is more important for understanding it
to explore methods of conceptualising than producing statements about it, of which a theory is
expected to be made of. For the denition of the general method, I found that B.Josephson and
B.Rubik, in the a report on the 1992 Athens Symposium on Science and Consciousness [JR92],
present accurately the diculties of a science of consciousness, in particular when submitting
oneself to 'constraints on thinking about consciousness that might be imposed by conventional
modes of thought'. They arrived in particular at the two following conclusions:
"We need actively to address the limitations of scientic approaches, verication, and theories,
and to nd a place in our world view for personal knowledge gained through introspection." [1]
"Language itself can provide an eective means of exploring quasi-objectively what has
previously been characterised as being purely subjective." [2]
Although I was not aware of this report before writing down the present text, the other article
I wrote last year, titled A formal window on phenomenal objectness [G20], was partially devoted
to conclusion [2], in particular the question of how to construct a collective discourse about
consciousness and how it is related to the activity of the (human) brain, that would consist in
reliable knowledge. I formulated in this article the idea that this construction should involve a
dialogue between the disciplines of mathematics [for to connect the structure of the experiencing
subject and the structure of the brain, one has to use mathematical language] and of philosophy
[as consciousness is a typical object of philosophy, with corresponding diculties]. Along a
history of demarcation, these disciplines acquired a certain form which make them practically
incompatible, and the dialogue between them dicult. In order to re-form this dialogue I analysed
the co-denition of mathematics and philosophy in relation with how they make use of language,
that I interpreted using some notions of statical and dynamical designations that I introduced.
Abstracting the factual and historical separation of mathematics and philosophy in terms of
the compartimented use of these two types of designations, one may see that mathematics and
philosophy can take forms that can coexist in the same (meaningful) discourse. I was then able
to build on this conceptualisation a way to approach one fundamental aspect of consciousness
identied in Integrated information theory and that I chose to rename phenomenal objectness.
Although there is certainly a lot more to say about the use of language to talk about conscious-
ness, my point in the present text is to address the conclusion [1]. The status of introspection
seems to root a critical division between theoretists and experimentalists. As S.Dehaene ex-
presses it [D13], the period of behaviorism in cognitive sciences and its rejection of introspection
and consciousness as an object of study left a mark, and it is only recently that consciousness has
been reconsidered as a serious object of study in cognitive sciences. However experimentalists
- S.Dehaene in particular - reconsidering introspection often take it as an object of inquiry, in
restricted situations in which it can be properly dened, and not as a method for this inquiry.
In fact this kind of restriction may come with a restriction of expressive power. When taken as a
method of inquiry, introspection is often only considered, when properly used, as a way to collect
necessary data (see for instance [BP13]). What experimentalists often forget is that the eld of
mathematics provides a clear example of construction of clear concepts and reliable knowledge
on them - meaning not only data - coming out of the use of introspection: in a sense one can say
of mathematics that they are a particular form of 'creative introspection' - creative of concepts.
I think that the main critic addressed to introspection as a method of inquiry is that it distorts
its object, leading in particular to false judgements on it. In fact I nd this critic incoherent for the
reason that any inquiry of the reality, wether theoretical or experimental, involves a distortion
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of what is taken as object of study - the object as it is perceived - replacing it in the mind
with another set of objects and relations. Also it often happens that even careful experimental
inquiry arrives at false judgements about its object (due to manipulation or interpretation errors)
- however these errors are only temporary as long as one is able to look into the protocol and
its realisation and interpretation in order to correct the errors. In fact this distortion of the
object does not really matter, as long as ultimately the process of inquiry leads to the observable
augmentation of the battery of (meaningful) concepts available to analyse the reality.
My point of view is that an understanding of consciousness can only come with its conceptu-
alisation, and for that the use of introspection is necessary. The real question is then not shall we
use introspection ? but how to use it ? In answering this question it might be of interest to look
at how introspection is used in the eld of mathematics, what are the conditions (in particular
self-constraints) that lead this use of introspection to meaningful concepts, and how to generalise
this use to other objects of introspection, such as the structure of the experiencing subject. This
generalisation does not have to involve at least in the beginning - and in fact one should not
expect it - the importation of language structures present in the eld of mathematics as it is (for
instance, axioms, denitions, theorems and their proofs, or even principled theorems), such as
in Integrated information theory or Predictive coding theory for instance.
As a matter of fact the practice of mathematics deals closely with an aspect of introspection
which makes its use dicult, which is the chaoticity of what appears in the mind along with a
particular designation. What I call designation here (in the same way as in [G20]) is the action of
making present a certain 'area' of cognition, which happens when we pronouce a word for instance.
The word 'consciousness' is an example of dynamical designation, meaning that with it many
things may be present in my mind when I think about consciousness or discuss about the nature
of consciousness with another person, and it is not clear how they are structured, what amongst
these seem to characterise what it is, etc; moreover they appear chaotically, without a rational
order. This makes it dicult in particular to introspect about this designation, but not impossible
in principle (in fact it is by introspection that experimentalists such as S.Dehaene can come up
with a clean denition of a particular type of introspection, for instance conscious access to an
information). This is the chaoticity that H.Poincaré, in the quote above, locates in the 'subliminal
self ', which I believe corresponds to what philosophers since Plato have called χώρα, initially
(before Plato) designating the territory of the πόλις outside of the city, an intermediate between
its inside and outside. Plato mapped the structure of the πόλις to what I called the structure
of the experiencing subject, designating by the term χώρα what lies between the intelligible and
the sensible. My interpretation of χώρα is that it is the cognitive 'place' where mental intelligible
content is formed and unformed, in particular by integrating or disintegrating partially conscious
elements; in line with H.Poincaré, this is the place where conceptual creation is possible (in
particular in mathematics). The diculty of dwelling in the χώρα is that it does not appear
in the same way as objects (the type of beings we are more used to deal with conceptually)
appear, or any experience: in fact is a place of particular type of experiences, where objects
disappear and appear; it seems as chaos from the point of view of the conscious center, the πόλις,
but appears progressively ordered in its own way (as deterministic chaos tells us) when dwelling
in it. In fact I think that χώρα should be the object, the place as well as the method of any
theoretical study of consciousness, because that is where the dynamics between the conscious
and the unconscious happen, thus delineating the conscious - as well as the unconscious. Any
theory which does not is not actually talking about consciousness as such but something else.
As a matter of fact the chaoticity of χώρα enters in contradiction with a method of inquiry
dened by pre-determined and well-dened rules. On the other hand, although mathematicians
may dier on the degree to which they accept how much unconscious is involved in reasoning, I
believe that any mathematician would agree with H.Poincaré that there is a part of unconscious
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work in mathematical creation. The way H.Poincaré describes this creation is related to the way
mathematicians nd the solution to a problem, observing that the process of nding a solution
consists rst in a conscious 'ingestion' of the elements of a problem, and some failed attempts
to search for a solution which extends directly the methods developped to solve other problems.
Then the work is the one of the unconscious at the end of which the solution 'appears' with
extreme clarity, with only left the conscious work to write it down in a structured way, and verify
it by checking carefully every aspect of it. This is the kind of illumination that mathematicians
often like for it comes with a certain sense of beauty, but the apparition of a solution can appear
more progressively.
However chaoticity appears only in the individual introspection and not at the level of the
collective discourse, which is meticulously bound to consist in the presentation of well-formed
solutions to problems and denitions of concepts which appear useful along with the search for
solution. What may repell experimentalists from the use of introspection in cognitive science is
that it is often rather shallow and short before results of introspection are presented. Contrarily
to common belief, I think that the early exchange of ideas, before they are carefully and deeply
weighted, can only create confusion in the mind and the one of the other; furthermore it seems
that the rush into answering to the critics act on the development of the conceptualisation itself,
being determined by the dialogue and the psychology of theoricians more than the reality, their
need to be right over the other, holding certain ideas not because of their expressive power but
because they answer the critics, in particular when these critics come from a non-understanding
of the initial presentation of the theory. Concepts formed are thus not describing adequately this
reality but are conceived only to construct a presentable theory, which may become more and
more obscure. In fact it may also actually be clear that a discourse which is substantially formed
as a response to the other can not be closer to the truth than this other. Experimentalists
may see in the method of inquiry, introspection thought as the shallow and straightforward
judgement after 'looking inside', the origin of this confusion, but I think this is due mainly to
the way introspection is executed and how early the dialogue is involved in the constitution of a
conceptualisation. When it is not directly involved, the theorician is able to put his own ideas in
competition, thus detaching himself or herself from each of them, and the failure of an idea is not
the failure of the theorician or his or her way of thinking. Chaoticity is delt with by the individual
theorician and does not appear in the collective discourse. Maybe this type introspection should
be dierenciated from straightforward introspection - maybe one could name it introrelation. In
the remainder of this text however I will stick to the term introspection, for I believe that this is
the right use of the word.
On the contrary it seems that chaoticity appears directly in the discourse about consciousness,
and this problem has been adressed by B.Josephson and B.Rubik. To illustrate the problem,
I would like to quote a schematic dialogue written by D.Chalmers [C18] between realists and
illusionists about consciousness:
"Realist: People obviously feel pain, so illusionism is false.
Illusionist: You are begging the question against me, since I deny that people feel pain.
Realist: I am not begging the question. It is antecedently obvious that people feel pain, and the
claim has support that does not depend on assuming any philosophical conclusions. In fact this
claim is more obvious than any philosophical view, including those views that motivate
illusionism.
Illusionist: I agree that it is obvious that people feel pain, but obvious claims can be false, and
this is one of them. In fact, my illusionist view predicts that people will nd it obvious that they
feel pain, even though they do not.
Realist: I agree that illusionism predicts this. Nevertheless, the datum here is not that I nd
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it obvious that people feel pain. The datum is that people feel pain. Your view denies this
datum, so it is false.
Illusionist: My view predicts that you will nd my view unbelievable, so your denial simply
conrms my view rather than opposing it.
Realist: I agree that my denial is not evidence against your view. The evidence against your
view is that people feel pain.
Illusionist: I don't think that is genuine evidence.
Realist: If you were right, being me would be nothing like this. But it is something like this.
Illusionist: No. If `this' is how being you seems to be, then in fact being you is nothing like
this. If `this' is how being you actually is, then being you is just like this, but it is unlike how
being you seems to be."
Here is the way I see it:
Realist: I think you are wrong.
Illusionist: Hmmm. No I don't think so.
Realist: I aknowledge what you say, but I denitely think you are wrong.
Illusionist: God damnit, I am right.
and so on.. In other words, a dialogue between theoricians who, relying only on straight-
forward introspection to respond to critics without a prepared discourse that is the fruit of
retroaction on his or her own discourse - in particular examining the coherence of the ideas, the
signicance of the concepts used, their relations, the structuration of the discourse around few
central concepts, etc. - has more chance to be reduced ultimately, along with the dialogue, and
despite the apparent diversity of the arguments, in a simple repeated armation. In the words
of A.Whitehead:
"Philosophy is at once general and concrete, critical and appreciative of direct intuition. It is
not - or, at least, should not be - a ferocious debate between irritable professors." -
A.Whitehead, Adventures of ideas.
I think that it is possible from a 'third-person' point of view, to construct a coherent discourse
out of and including apparently opposite views, like the ones of the realist and the illusionist
about consciousness, which is closer to the reality than both of them. To illustate my point of
view, let me use an analogy with picking a movie to watch at the movie theater: when making
such a choice, I usually use a trick which consists in checking movies that are released in small
movie theaters, usually oriented to intellectual movies, and the ones which are released in larger
movie theators, oriented to popular movies; when a movie is in both lists, I am condent of its
quality. I have never been disappointed by this strategy. The reason, I think, is that these movies
realise a right balance between entertainment and humour, and the approach of a serious subject
in a subtle way; in other words it realises a balance between two tendencies in the individual taste
that is reinforced socially although it may lower the quality of the cultural content, restricting
to one aspect of the reality - emotional or intellectual in the case of movies, theoretical and
experimental for consciousness. Standing in between these tendencies does not mean producing
a new cultural content only out of simple combinatorics of established styles, but coming back
to a more original meaning, and valuing the subject as it is over what one is able to say about
it or the way one is able to say something about it.
One way to compare approaches of consciousness one a comparable basis is to consider the
way these approaches make judgements about consciousness, in particular why consciousness
is considered as a problem: this is what D.Chalmers [C18] called the meta-problem of con-
sciousness. To add upon D.Chalmers approach, I think this might be a more fruitful way to
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conceptualise consciousness than rening existing positions - especially when there is a lack of
concepts to support adequately these positions. I tend to think that consciousness is a problem
for its existence enters in contradiction with the way we understand the world; thus I would
like to focus more on conceptualising the way we arrive at judgements about consciousness such
as 'the mind works as a machine' or 'no it does not ' or 'some being is conscious when there is
something like it is to be this being '. In particular the formulation of these dierent statements
seem to dier in how introspection is used to speak about experience. In fact expressing these
statements on a common ground can not only make a clearer sense of them but allow to push
further the introspective mechanisms by which we arrive at them.
In the present text I would like to present one such way to use (creative) introspection. Al-
though the framework that I presented in the last paper [G20] should be considered only as the
beginning of a longer study, it appeared more critical to develop further the type of approach it
consists in rather than following one approach, and put in competition the approaches that it can
produce in their conceptualising power, and their capacity to build a collective discourse (which
is a criterion which matters because it critically discriminated, in the XVIIth century, alchemy
and the modern form of science). I would like to mention also that the particular way of thinking
that I try to develop in this text imports from the area of my work in mathematics before getting
interested in the notion of information integration (computability and multidimensional dynam-
ics) a way to think about its objects towards the eld of consciousness studies. As a matter
of fact the intuitive idea of a relation between (un)computability and consciousness has been
posited by R.Penrose, who suggests that non-computability should be an aspect of consciousness
of any conscious being (see for instance his talk Mathematics, Mind and Consciousness [P20]).
Although it is speculation, an understanding of the limit between the computable and the un-
computable in mathematics may lead to some insight in consciousness, as well as the study of
faculties of the mind which are beyond any computation, such as understanding (to which I will
devote another text). In fact what I think undecidability results suggest relates to the thoughts
of H.Poincaré: the source of mathematical creation is not algorithmical and instead relates to
the specic structure of the experiencing subject (and its relation with the unconscious).
In order to get more precise on how my (modest) work on computability can relate to the
structure of the experiencing subject, let me give a short summary of this work. After A.Turing
introduced his computing machines in his paper On computable numbers, with an application
to the entscheidungsproblem in 1936, R.Berger (1966) [B66] and then R.Robinson (1971) [R71]
proposed some constructions embedding computing machines inside hierarchically structured
sets of plane tilings in order to disprove H.Wang's conjecture that there exists an algorithm
which can decide if one can tile the plane using a nite set of decorated square tiles under the
constraint of assembling rules depending on the decorations. More recently M.Hochman and
T.Meyerovitch [HM10] adapted R.Robinson's construction in order to characterize the possible
values of entropy that these sets of tilings generate, when considered as dynamical systems, with a
computability criterion. Even more recently researchers in this eld have been interested in how
exactly dynamical constraints on these dynamical systems aect this kind of characterization
(rendering entropy, for instance, 'more' computable). I have published with coauthors some
mathematical results in this direction. What I think was interesting in these constructions is
that the implementation of the computing machines had to be complexied and adopt a particular
'form' adapted to the constraints. As I was interested in cognitive sciences and the structure
and organisation of the human brain, I naturally made some analogies with the living, and
how dynamical constraints could explain how and why the human brain has the (information
processing) structure it has (and thus how and why the human mind has the structure it has).
Of course in this area of mathematics the dynamical constraints are adapted to mathematicaly
study and thus simple and abstract enough to be tractable. When I think about the humain
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brain I think about more concrete and (yet) less well-dened constraints, such as for instance:
integration of information (in order for instance to take into account many dispersed factors in
making a decision), resistance to small perturbations, the possibility to mechanically and rapidly
explore many possible decisions in order to adopt the 'right' one (this kind exibility constraints
contradicts in principle the one of information integration, so there has to be a trade-o), the
possibility for a functional region of the brain to be used for various purposes (adaptability), etc.
The possibility of the human brain to simulate any possible algorithm should be related to the
adaptability to the evolution of the world. The result of these many constraints of 'local' and
'global' adaptability and structure 'force' the brain to be organised in its particular way.
As in my other paper [G20], one can see a tiling as the description of a (visual) experience.
Furthermore one can think of an experience at a certain time (including all senses and not only
visual) as described by a similar object. As well my (temporal) experience can be thought of as a
series of such objects (with small enough temporal gaps). This experience is conceptualised with
causal relations between 'patterns' in this experience (for instance 'if I drop an apple from my
hand, it will fall on the closest object down in the vertical direction'), collected into a structure
(for instance causal relations can be chained to obtain other causal relations, and there exist
elementary causal relations which can not be obtained this way). Science explains or disprove
these causal relations by constructing a picture of the outside world, and its causal structure,
such that this 'ner' causal structure can be projected on the causal structure of the experience
(this allows the mind to act on the world using this ner causation). In its current form cognitive
science tend to search in the physical an explanation for the phenomenal, while the interpretation
of explanation in terms of causal structure allows other ways. Furthermore considering the set
of possible experiences in which a rst-personal world consits, it is reasonable to assume that
it can be described by a set of rules which can be obtained algorithmically. A mechanistic
interpretation or explanation of how this rst personal world 'works' is a similar object which
can be described by a nite set of local rules, accounting for what happens at the 'microscopic
level'. The object 'rst-personal' world is similar to the one of 'micro-world' that I dened in my
last paper, however it is a lot more dicult to discuss directly because its extension can not be
grasped (in particular because it changes) and thus to communicate and to make progress in its
understanding. I think one should instead consider larger and larger 'parts' of the rst-personal
world which are causally isolated and map them to a progressively constituted model. In this
text my purpose is to begin with the statement of A.Turing that the human mind can simulate
any of his computing machines, that I take as the description of a fundamental mode of the
experiencing subject, and try to complexify this model using some introspective method that
I will dene in this paper, using in particular theoretical constraints in terms of information
transport and the account for high level phenomena. Ideas that I will propose are speculative,
as only partly based on experimental evidence, but they should be seen as steps in a theoretical
process which posits hypotheses before refuting them repeatedly, until one arrives at a satisfying
theory. They are presented in the second part of this text. In the rst part I abstract a framework
for introspection which is based on classical papers that I interpret as steps in the construction
of an introspective reasoning about consciousness.
II. Elements of an introspective method
The purpose of this section is to gather elements of an introspective method in order to
investigate the structure of the experiencing subject (which I will begin to do in Section III);
it consists in analysing philosophical positions about consciousness and how they make use of
introspection to conceptualise it. Before entering into this analysis, I would like to rule out
arguments on introspection of its main philosophical opponent, namely illusionism, by the idea
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that illusionism consists ultimately on the rejection of introspection based on its misuse (including
by illusionists). Comments on this positions are not the result of a thorough review on illusionism
and only on a pair of recent papers of K.Frankish [F16] and D.Dennett, that I take as representing
well enough illusionism for my purpose here.
II.1  On illusionism - introspection taken as a non-method
Illusionism is, according to K.Frankish [F16], the position according to which "phenomenal
consciousness is an illusion" and "aims to explain why it seems to exist". To this position is
opposed the one of realism, which is that phenomenal consciousness is real. I nd interesting to
note that the example which is almost systematically taken to illustrate this point of view is the
one of the feeling of pain: since pain exists, is specic to a conscious being (in order for pain to
be felt, it has to be felt by such a conscious being) and that the feeling of pain diers from what
happens in the physical world when I see such a being in pain, then phenomenal consciousness
exists. This position is simpler to analyse because it does not oer several seemingly dierent
arguments: while it seems extravagant for realists to deny the existence of pain, I think that
the confusion has to be found in the meaning of the word 'existence', and in order to enlighten
the use of existence by realists I think it is interesting to wonder why the example of pain is so
reccurent. The feeling of pain is in fact one example of 'object' that I can experience and which
I can designate in a statical way (it does change over time, although there may be dierences in
how I feel the pain); this is why I can designate it to the other and that the other can recognise,
and answer to the question: do you feel pain now ? In this sense of existence, it does not matter
wether or not subjects can nd it intersubjectively out-there.
II.1.1  What is an illusion ?
In order to try to understand the opposite position, that is the one of illusionism, one should
search for a denition of what an illusion is. For that I would like to consider one simple visual
illusion which will serve as a paradigmatic example for this analysis. Such an illusion is rst an
experiencial situation in which one considers a bidimensional colored picture, such as the Penrose
triangle (considered by N.Humphrey) which I reproduced below:
In this situation one should dierenciate the picture itself, which I think as the raw experience
described by an array of bits of information encoding for which color is displayed on which position
on a square grid of pixels (which is stored somewhere in the computer used by the reader), from
what is perceived in this picture, in other words the experience that one has of it. This experience
contains for instance the 'impression' that each of sides of this 'thick triangle' are tridimensional.
I think it is reasonable to say that this impression can be thought of as a conceptualisation of
the raw experience described by with the array, which is 'added over' the picture itself. Thus far
the situation consists thus in a picture augmented with a conceptualisation of it. Furthermore
we are used to analyse (most of the time automatically) this kind of experience and think about
it, especially because of its conceptualisation, as the representation of a tridimensional object
'out-there'. However with enough attention I may conclude that in this case it is not possible
because this hypothesis enters in contradiction with the intuition that I hold of a tridimensional
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space, unless I think of two of the sides as not connected in the tridimensional space, although
they coincide in the bidimensional representation (this is the idea of Gregundrum, named by
N.Humphrey after its creator R.Gregory).
This kind of situation is called an illusion because it is deceiving. One may reformulate this
and say that in contact with this situation, the mind is distorting what there is to perceive in it. I
think however that we should be careful about what is exactly happening with this contact: i)my
mind makes automatically a conceptualisation of the picture while experiencing it; ii) then I may
or not make a judgement that the picture is a bidimensional representation of a tridimensional
object which has some particular property (similar to the property of the representation, that
the sides are two by two connected), which I make based only on the conceptualisation and a
certain thought habit; iii) I may or not believe in this judgement. The situation is deceiving
when I arrive at the third point with a belief in this judgement, for the simple reason that this
judgement is false: there can not be such a tridimensional object. In other words this object
does not exist, it is never perceived. On the other hand I am not really distorting the picture
because I am only adding a conceptualisation over it, and what I really see is still accessible via
introspection - an introspection which is not straightforward but carefully executed. Furthermore
the conceptualisation and the raw experience do exist to my mind, at least as much as my actual
experience because factually I am constructing them out of this actual experience. When the
picture is factually a projection on a plane of the Gregundrum, I may change its orientation and
observe that the tridimensional object is not the hypothetical (impossible) object; however when I
come back to the initial position, this has negated my judgement but not the conceptualisation of
the picture, which is still there. Moreover it does not resolve the error which underlies the factual
judgement, which is that the hypothetical object is impossible. What may remove denitively this
error by a reasoning of mathematical nature, which uses introspection in a non straightforward
way, meaning an introspection not only about the situation in question but a set of possible
situations which consists in the tridimensional completions of this one.
Looking closely at how we arrive at certain judgements - the idea of D.Chalmers - can lead
to envision other possibilities, ultimately proving or disproving these judgements. This can be
applied as well to judgements on consciousness itself.
I will then take an illusion to be a situation in which one is misled by an automatic con-
ceptualisation, if not resisting to certain thought habits, into holding and believing in a false
judgement about the experiencial content of this situation. I think that science, and in partic-
ular methodical science, has been constructed over the idea of a 'disillusionment ' process, but
has falsely identied the observation of the material world as the only way to access 'reality ' - in
particular excluding introspection from the method of inquiry.
II.1.2  The use of illusion in illusionism - about distortion
The illusionists reasonings mainly consist in analogies between some experiencial situations
which involve what realists may call 'phenomenal consciousness' and are not well understood
and simple illusions, typically to conclude that there is nothing 'phenomenal' in experiencing
this situation phenomenal consciousness does not exist and only 'seem' to exist. When reading
the texts I found that this comparison is often supercial - in the sense that the there is no precise
correspondance drawn between contents of the two situations involved - and confusing: to use the
vocabulary of illusionists, these two situations 'seem' to be similar but they are not. In fact one
may notice in the texts that there is usually no denition of what 'phenomenal consciousness',
as well as to 'exist', is taken to be. I usually take 'phenomenal' to be in my actual experience the
part of the conceptualisation of the raw experience that I perceive as received from the senses,
while illusionists seem to take the term 'phenomenal' as refering to a vague feeling about the
raw experience. Moreover it seems that something 'exists' for illusionists when it is present in
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the raw experience only, and it 'seem' to exist or to have certain properties when the object
in question, or the properties, lie in the conceptualisation of the raw experience. Sometimes
the term 'datum' seems to be used by illusionists to refer to what lies in the raw experience
(in the very conventional sense of experimental science I believe), while realists seem to use the
term 'datum' to refer to something given, which is present to the mind, and which can be taken
intersubjectively as an object. This confusion appears there is the discourse of D.Dennett [D16]:
"Imagine Chalmers' declaration that phenomenal consciousness is a datum, transposed into the
claim that a lady-sawn-in-half is a datum, or the claim that we are directly acquainted with the
real presence of a lady-sawn-in-half. You may think you're directly acquainted with this, but
that's a fact of personal psychology, at best an unshakable intuition, not a datum."
In the example of the lady-sawn-in-half, it is clear that the lady-sawn-in-half is an impression,
leading to a false judgement, and not in the physical situation which is projected in my experience.
So it is not a datum in the sense of D.Dennett, but the impression itself is a datum, it exists in the
conceptualisation of the experience (otherwise the sentences of Dennett are empty of meaning),
as well as the paradigmatic example of realists - pain - when it appears in a situation. I believe
that a careful analysis of what an illusion is composed of and a more careful use of analogies
may remove some misunderstandings. The same confusion happens with the comparison of
N.Humphrey between sensations and impossible objects such as the hypothetical tridimensional
object of which the Penrose triangle would be a representation: sensations should be compared
to the conceptualisation of the picture and not the impossible object.
I think in fact there should be an explanation to the divergence between the meanings held
for the term 'exist' by realists and illusionists. What I would propose for such an explanation
is that illusionists attribute more value to certain parts of an experience, which seem to be the
ones on which the current methodology of science can apply, where realists seem to refuse to
apply such a dierence in value. It appears clear to me when I read the following in K.Frankish's
article:
"In another analogy, Rey compares our introspective lives to the experience of a child in a dark
cinema who takes the cartoon creatures on screen to be real (Rey, 1992, p. 308)."
In fact these creatures are real, although children may be wrong to think that there are present
in the physical world (which does not necessarily make sense to them). In fact if we were about
to talk about children psychology, we could not avoid considering their ctions as real objects of
study (otherwise, why bother ?) and thus have them valuable. I have to recognise that the above
analogy may be convincing, but only because we tend in general to deny value to the experiences
of children. As I mentioned above, science has been constructed on the attribution of more value
to certain experiences - in particular the observation of the material world. This valuation is
often implicit and unquestioned, but lead to a real distortion of certain experiencial situations
in order to make the argument more ecient, as in the following analogy of D.Dennett, quoted
by K.Frankish:
"Dennett compares consciousness to the user illusions created by the graphical interfaces
through which we control our computers (Dennett, 1991, pp. 21620, 30914). The icons,
pointers, les, and locations displayed on a computer screen correspond in only an abstract,
metaphorical way to structures within the machine, but by manipulating them in intuitive ways
we can control the machine eectively, without any deeper understanding of its workings. The
items that populate our introspective world have a similar status, Dennett suggests. They are
metaphorical representations of real neural events, which facilitate certain kinds of mental
self-manipulation but yield no deep understanding insight into the processes involved."
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In this analogy again the two situations seem to be similar but are not: they have a dierent
structure. In fact in the experience, the screen is the experience, and the the structure of the
machine is in principle observable directly; drawing on the analogy of Dennett, one can see the
interior of the machine only via a simulation of it (like a virtual machine) which is displayed on
the screen - in fact in the reality it appears on a screen simulated on the actual screen. Putting
it this way, it is not clear anymore that the interior of the simulated machine is more real than
other objects which appear on the screen (les, pointers, icons). The only way to make sense of
the fact that they are 'real' is that they are considered more valuable - and this boils down to
say that they are real because Dennett says they are. One may notice also that the analogy of
Dennett breaks on other points, such as the fact that while sensations exist but are not easily
delineable, icons and pointers are. Moreover what the virtual machine proves is not less abstract
than icons and pointers: the way we think about both of them (and unterstand them) does
entirely belongs to the conceptualisation (in particular simulated mechanisms would consists in
sets of causal relations, as well as pointers and icons) we make of a raw experience. So if we
were to say that icons and pointers are not real, what would be ? This reminds me of Zhuangzi's
celebrated dream of the buttery [Giles]:
Once upon a time, I, Chuang Tzu, dreamt I was a buttery; uttering hither and thither, to all
intents and purposes a buttery. I was conscious only of following my fancies as a buttery,
and was unconscious of my individuality as a man. Suddenly I awaked, and there I lay, myself
again. Now I do not know whether I was then a man dreaming I was a buttery or whether I
am now a buttery, dreaming I am a man.
It is dicult for Zhuangzi to decide if he is in reality a buttery or a man, but it is dicult
to conceive that he is none of them. A more reasonable position would be, in my opinion, to
say that a priori both the buttery an the man are real in a certain sense. In order to navigate
individually in the experience and understand it, there is no need to distinguish between 'real'
and 'not real'; at the level of the constructed collective discourse, I think this should be also
the case, as long as the terms used have a clear (stable) meaning, especially if what is said can
act, one way or another, towards more understanding (providing for instance the idea of a useful
concept).
II.1.3  Another way to use introspection
I think that in the term 'theory' may also refer to multiple types of discourse, and in order to
think about the type of discourse, it may be useful to consider the social eect of this theory - in
it may lie the real nature of the theory. In the case of illusionism, it seems that the theory is more
an attempt to direct researchers to a certain method of inquiry more than about consciousness
itself. It is reasonable to take a position of conservatism a priori, meaning using in a priviledged
way the existing and accepted methods of inquiry, before rushing into revising these methods.
However it is not clear if the application of these methods leave more conceptualisation and
understanding capacity than hopes. Furthermore the manifestations of illusionism often take the
form of an unjustied prompting to disengage from any other method, in particular favouring
rational thinking over intuition - ultimately a progression into understanding has to involve
both. The eect of this discourse may moreover be ultimately to take away even more methods
that individuals possess to understand and explore intellectually without having to rely only on
academic (in particular scientic) authority, an eect which may itself motivated by the factual
status of the intellectual who works at understanding the physical reality.
I think that the reection on illusion may on the other hand provide useful intellectual tools
for inquiry, for they consist in situations in which the subject is in contact with a raw experience
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which can be completely described, whose conceptualisation can be agreed upon, and at the
same time contains concepts which appear only in the experience of the subject and not out-
there - which means that I can not see this concept as an actual cause of the behavior of another
subject: for instance I can feel pain wihout this pain being visible to the other and possibly
inducing a certain reaction of this other. Removing the negative value that is often attributed
to illusion, one can see a illusions as 'toy models' for investigating how the conscious subject
constructs (unconsciously) a conceptualisation of its raw experience: the kind of explanation
provided for these toy models may then be used to approach more complex situations. As the
conceptualisation may be expressed and intersubjectively agreed upon, it should be possible to
relate there the physical and the mental. On the other hand it is not clear if the kind of isolated
experiences corresponding to illusions can lead to an insight about consciousness as such and not
only about particular experiences.
I believe that the idea of illusionists that introspection can not be the source of reliable knowl-
edge is a mistake - it is possible though that what illusionists call 'introspection' corresponds to
what I call straightforward introspection. In fact I think that introspection should not be thought
as a way to 'inspect' the content of experience, but to simulate the creation of concepts which
make a priori sense of what appears in the mind - of course the value of particular concepts is
determined by their further capacity for understanding. Along with this use of introspection, the
epistemic position of the intellectual should dier from the image of a holder of knowledge to be
supplied to general other as a product and resemble the one of a participant in the constitution
of a collective discourse, proposing a narrative articulating concepts, from which concepts may
be extracted, modied, re-articulated in other narratives, whose capacity to provide an under-
standing may allow them to resist natural selection. In other words, individuals do not have
an authority on the inner world which would come from a natural authority on their own - on
this point I agree with Dennett; only (some) concepts and narratives may eventually acquire
authority. In this picture I believe that a 'scientic approach' of consciousness should not direct
towards the physical world but to the constitution of narratives articulating 'elementary' - and
in particular stable - concepts. In order to do so, one can try to condensate unstable concepts
into more stable ones, by progressively concentrating the look on thiner and thiner areas until
an object appears; in such a process the use of analogy is usually not enough to make sense, and
can only serve as an introspective tool. Moreover the consistant look in the direction pointed
at by a certain concept may make appear (in the sense that they were not present there before)
more elementary concepts in the corresponding cognitive area, which constitute the designating
one. This corresponds to an abstract form of increasing 'discernment' which I believe allows the
use of introspection in a general sense. I thus agree with Dennett [D15] on the following to a
certain extent:
"Qualia seem atomic to introspection, unanalyzable simplesthe smell of violets, the shade of
blue, the sound of an oboebut this is clearly an eect of something like the resolution of our
discernment machinery."
as well as the following:
"If our vision were as poorly spatially resolved as our olfaction, when a bird ew by, the sky
would suddenly 'go all birdish,'that peculiar, indescribable birdishness that one would
experience in the visual presence of birds. And this resolution is variable: music lovers and
wine enthusiasts and others can train up their ear and their palate and come to distinguish,
introspectively, the combining elements of what used to seem atomic and unanalyzable."
Some of the judgements on phenomenal aspects of experience may reveal false, - in particular
indecomposability for some of them - however I think this would be wrong to say that they do
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not exist, just as birds do exist even if 'in reality' they are collections of atoms - they do at least
as a concept, which we may explain, if so, why it is a natural one. In fact I believe that the belief
of indecomposability of pain for instance may well come from lack of introspection - which is a
consequence of the simple fact taht we usually avoid the feeling of pain. When looking closer to
this feeling, I personally distinguish dierent elementary feelings, like some 'tension' in the locus
of pain, as well as some heat.
On the other hand it is dicult to conceive that colors can be decomposable, and that
ultimately the decomposition of a feeling like pain could not involve 'phenomenal elements'
similar to colors. Furthermore the fact that consistant introspection reveals an articulation of
more elementary concepts does not mean that the initial one can be reduced to this articulation
of concepts - they are a priori dierent experiences. It is probable on the other hand that they are
'functionally related ', meaning that there is a transformation from one to the other which is not
the simple collection. In order to 'explain' the initial concept, - wether considering it a distortion
or not - it is thus not sucient to 'look closer': one also has to nd how the transformation is
operated. Let us consider looking at a unicolor picture for instance. The conception that we
hold is that the information of this picture is processed by discrete devices - neurons - and that
the real picture that we see is a discrete object; but the picture appears as a continuum: by
which transformation does the brain transforms the discrete picture into a continuous one ? In
fact it is not even clear that with introspection the initial concept disappears and is replaced by
an underlying 'reality' - in particular in the case of wine enthusiasts - and it is possible that the
perception is enriched without reduction. This corresponds in fact to the use of introspection
that I would like to develop.
II.2  Introspection and understanding of what consciousness is
While enriching the set of concepts which serve to describe the experience is necessary, and
possible via introspection, it is not enough to understand what consciousness is. I see here two
aspects of understanding which have to be intertwined with the conceptualisation itself: rst the
choice of a path for introspection, and then the structuration - in particular hierarchisation -
of the conceptual set acquired along the way. I will explain what I mean by this in theory and
then in practice, before turning to an example of their implementation in Integrated information
theory.
II.2.1  Foundations
Where to direct introspection? I take as a fact that the purpose of religion is and has been
to conceptualise human experience in its most directly experienced aspects in order to provide
means to 'navigate' amongst possible 'forms' of conscious experiencing - in particular to escape
from a form characterized by being in a place called hell ; or if you are reluctant to use this
term, you may think about the inner existence of R.Raskolnikov, in Crime and Punishment
[F.Dostoïevski], after his murder of the old pawnbroker. Several philosophers have discussed
the 'why ' and 'how ' of this kind of conceptualisation. My point here is not discuss highly
controversial subjects but to ask the following question: how can a scientic approach dier
from religion on the matter of consciousness and what can it bring to an understanding of this
phenomenon ?
I believe that it can dier in nding 'mechanical roots' for conscious experiencing, rooting
or disproving statements about it (or practices which act on it), which may make them more
accessible to understand and rely on. I think that in doing so one does not have to rely (only)
on the study of the physical world and the structure of the human brain, but also on a use
of introspection which should progressively reveal 'elementary' concepts - which do not have to
13
be necessarily of physical nature - of experiencing and their articulations. Understanding the
experiencing subject here should mean conceptualising its structure in terms of these elementary
concepts in such a way that the eect of a targeted perturbation (by the subject himself or
herself) can be conceived and predicted - a prediction which in principle does not have to be
mechanical. In praticular the concepts themselves should be statical designations, meaning that
what is pointed out by the concept in the experience does not change.
I think that such an understanding should be done before any attempt of dening an external
measure of 'consciousness'. Furthermore I do not believe that consciousness could be measured
as a quantity, but as a specic type of activity pattern (that is, not necessarily computation in the
usual sense), which is shaped for instance by teleological constraints (the simple subsistance),
and which indicates potential eective consciousness, meaning the possibility for a person to
interact with others, one way or another, involving the acquisition of information, the possibility
to emmit a judgement about this information, about its interest, etc. The so-called 'hard problem
of consciousness' may philosophically be interesting to investigate aftermath, but it is detached
in principle from practical applications.
Introspecting on the structure of experiencing, I think that 'where' I should look at is where
the conceptualisation out of statistical designations may be possible. I think that looking at the
dynamical relations between the conscious mind and the unconscious one, or in other words how
objects appear and disappear along with the activity of the mind should reveal something about
experiencing more than what constantly appears to the mind - for this is in principle accidental.
Moreover the understanding of the structure of the experiencing subject should involve a 'local'
study, meaning the type of experiencing dynamics (for instance access to an information, or active
integration of multiple informations, etc) that the subject can have in a particular cognitive area,
as well as a 'global' one, meaning how these types of dynamics are articulated by the subject -
probably hierarchically.
How to structure the conceptualisation? Conceptualising is at the beginning enriching
the set of concepts available in the particular cognitive area that is looked at. However some of
them may not be useful and in fact potentially obstructing understanding - since it is dicult
to deal with and manipulate too much informational content simultaneaously. In order to arrive
at such undersanding, one should then select some more important concepts over others and
structure the remaining ones. Each intellectual practice has its own way to make this selection
and structuration, in a way that is adapted to the objects it is dealing with, and which is
manifested ultimately in the language structures which compose the corresponding discourse.
As a matter of fact, approaching consciousness scientically, it should not be expected that the
discourse about it should adopt the structures of languages which compose the discourse of science
in general (as I mentioned in Section I), in particular because the 'object' of study is not extracted
from an experience or a set of experiences, but is relative to experiencing itself. For this reason
we should retract to the experiencial foundation of the methods of science before re-deriving and
synchronise intersubjectively around adapted language structures. In fact the fundamental idea
that I take from M.Merleau-Ponty of how science regulates concepts is by negation of negation.
By the rst negation I mean the act of the subject to try to suppress transcendentally a certain
idea. Let us take for instance the idea of truth of a particular formulated theorem: I may negate
this idea by holding a certain notion of what is a mathematical and attempting to detect in
the proof of the theorem some error which corresponds to this notion. If I do then I have to
abandon the idea (at least momentarily) that the theorem is actually true. Otherwise if after
some time I do not nd an error, then my negation is negated (second occurence of negation).
In fact what science - here I include mathematics - holds as true is what resists negation. This
idea is realised experiencially in dierent ways, according to the eld, even outside of science:
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why for instance do we want solipsism not to hold ? There is no logical or physical reason for
that other than than the emotional negation which consists in the extreme feeling of solitude.
In principle, without this negation, solipsism seems to be a perfectly valid position from an
individual point of view. If one accepts that solipsism does not hold, then the experience of the
others exist 'somewhere', which means that it is necessary to re-think our understanding of space
and time for this somewhere to make sense - I believe that it is on this premise that C.List's
Many worlds theory of consciousness [L21] is based. I think that drawing by introspection a
'map' of feelings of distance and proximity to the others may lead to an idea of how to formulate
more precisely this. I usually also consider that concepts can be regulated simply by forgetting:
if a concept is not recurrent in the mind, triggered again by a question or an observation, it is
unconsciously considered as meaningless and forgotten - maybe this could actually be a denition
of meaninglessness. Only central concepts of the situation considered are left with time, and the
'degree' of recurrence should provide a mean to structure and hierarchize these ones.
II.2.2  In practice
In practice some cognitive areas are more dicult to introspect than others. The notion
of 'information integration' is an example. I may have many ideas of how to picture it with
articulated elementary concepts, or in other words how it is 'realised' in my mind, or how it may
be realised in the human brain, but there is no clear way to select one over the others, and no
clear way to grasp a 'space' of all the possibilities to picture it. In fact in local cases I can actively
integrate two informations when I am planning for instance: 'when the clock will display 9:00, I
will go out ', and I can picture that these two informations are connected for some time by a 'link'
that I create between the two. However it is not possible for me to picture straightforwardly
how dierent aspects (color, shape, for instance) of the same object are integrated, or how the
'I' and the phenomenal experience are (for I can say that this experience is 'mine'). Of course
integration may be realised in dierent ways but if I could grasp all the situations of information
integration at once - just like we can grasp all the possible triangles in a single concept - I could
nd what is common in all information integration phenomena and possibly derive and study
the particular from the general.
There is no other way to nd out if a certain area of cognition is 'introspectable' or not than
to try, which means focusing the attention towards this area and see what appears there, and
with practice focusing on areas where original concepts appear, which moreover may be useful
once fully formed in other situations, in particular ones where introspection is dicult. I found
useful, when a cognitive area is introspectable but no clear denition of a concept appears, to
put articially in 'competition' possibilities of conceptualisations by creating a framework which
allows the systematisation of this competition and the record of the signicance of each idea
- this allows in particular to put in competition my ideas with ones of others - with the aim
that one or few of these ideas appear progressively to be most signicant. This was one of the
purposes of the last paper [G20].
Several accounts of 'consciousness' using mathematical language have been proposed, includ-
ing Integrated information theory and Predictive coding, as well as - to a certain extent - Global
neuronal workspace theory. I believe that this can be relatively surprising, and it is natural to
question the use of mathematics for conceptualising consciousness as such. I believe that the
nature of the project of understanding consciousness in mechanistical terms, that is nding ele-
mentary concepts and their relations to describe it, calls for the use of mathematical language:
indeed, when sustained introspection is necessary to make these elementary concepts appear to
my mind, I expect that the situation is the same for others. Since the corresponding designations
are 'thiner' than the ones of the common language, I may not be able to use words to describe the
content of my mind after the sustained introspection. Instead I could designate abstract objects
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and the relations between them using mathematical symbols - since they are a priori semantically
neutral, they immediately refer to 'an abstract object ' - with the idea that this structure, when
projected on the cognitive area in question, will reveal to the other relatively unambiguously the
concepts I have in mind. In order to explain how this might work, I like to think about Sperling
experiment: when my mind is clear, an unconscious content does not appear because it is in
competition with many other contents, but when I hold a certain object in mind - in particular
some abstract structure - the unconscious contents which are somehow related to this object
appear (they are selected).
However the use of mathematics in order to describe the mind in general is very delicate. The
main reason is that we tend to assimilate mathematical objects to the symbols that represent
them - an idea that I expressed in [G20], while they refer to a mental reality (although stable),
and often times when a mathematical symbolism is used for another purpose than its initial
one, the two mental realities are assimilated, and meaning is lost along the development of the
discourse. One of the rare occasions which led to a meaningful formalism was the formalisation
of computation by A.Turing - a meaning partly due to the Church-Turing thesis, in particular
that the mind can 'simulate' any possible computing machine. The method that I propose in
Section III consists in reconsidering the cognitive situation in which this statement appears,
and progressively account for aspects of the conceptualisation of experience in situations which
are closely related to this one, in order to propose ultimately a 'model' for the structure of the
experiencing subject. The remainder of Section II will be devoted to integrate in this study
some principles of introspection which underly intuitions of philosophers about consciousness, in
particular in relation with computing machines; this is also the occasion to rule out too radical
positions concerning the idea that 'the mind works as a computing machine'.
II.2.3  The example of integrated information theory
Before moving further, I would like to comment briey on Integrated information theory
and its use of introspection and mathematical language, providing a complement of my critics
written in [G20]. The text [IIT] oers an overview of this theory; I also recommend [KT20] for
an exposition of the formalism aimed at researchers with formal training. The theory begins
with introspection of fundamental properties of experience in general - what proponents call
axioms; here introspection is straightforward, although the exact meaning of these fundamental
properties is not clear (I proposed an interpretation that I nd clearer, although not formal,
in [G20]), preventing any 'verication' that my own experience has these properties. From my
point of view, the formalism of Integrated information theory is in fact obtained by projection
in a xed formal context, in other words it is expected that these properties should be expressed
in a certain type of formalism - this is one of the expections I mentioned earlier that should be
removed. By this shift the formalism leaves completely the experience - it is unsituated - and
it should not be expected to explain anything about it. As a matter of fact one can nd easily
language constructions which have no meaning - in other words they do not point at anything
in the experience, it is an empty designation - such as "a square which is also a circle". Since
the formalism does not point systematically at something which is tightly related to its origin,
the probability is low that it will be related to it in the end. This kind of relation has been
attempted, under the form of an 'explanation' of aspects of experience (for instance in [HT19]
for phenomenal space), but it is signicant to notice that this kind of explanation is based on
directly accessible aspects of experience, for which there are many other possible explanations,
including simpler and intuitive ones. For instance I would tend to characterize space with a
cognitive area 'equipped ' with an exploration process. The idea that the cerebellum does not
support conscious experience is not a fact and is only a judgement potentially false (have we
tested all the possible situations ? it may be that it does support conscious only in some of
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them). Even if it is the case, one could formulate this saying that 'I' do not have access to it, or
with a teological reason that if I could have, I may not be able to control this access and disturb
the functioning of my body. On the contrary, I think that an 'explanation' of consciousness should
'unveil' aspects of it that are not yet visible, and that unveiling may shed some light on visible
aspects. For any formalism, or simply an articulation of elementary concepts to be meaningful,
it should draw an 'introspective path' which brings the reader to a situation in which there is no
already commonly accessible conceptualisation, and proposing one that captures 'what it is like'
to be in this situation, and by comparison to the way the reader naturally conceptualises it, this
one can conrm or refute that the proposed conceptualisation is partial or faithful.
In the following I would like to convince the reader that this is possible by a form of creative
introspection which takes as basis the idea that the human mind can simulate any computing
machine instead of the 'axioms' of integrated information theory.
II.3  T.Nagel
II.3.1  What is it like to be a bat?
In his celebrated article What is it like to be a bat ? [N94], T.Nagel proposed an intuitive
denition of 'consciousness', under the form of a principled criterion for an organism to be
conscious or not:
"But no matter how the form may vary, the fact that an organism has conscious experience at
all means, basically, that there is something it is like to be that organism."
Although not unanimously accepted, this denition is often used, in particular to formulate
the hard problem of consciousness: how to explain what it is like to have a certain experience ?
which usually comes with the idea that this problem is not reachable by the scientic method
(in its current form). If not rigorously dening consciousness as such, I believe that the formula
of T.Nagel characterises accurately the organisms to which we attribute a form of consciousness
after a careful introspection. Here I use the term 'careful introspection' for the reason that one
can see - as M.Grazziano did - that we may tend attribute unconsciously conscious experience
to a systems which are not likely to be so - a ventriloquist's puppet for instance. I see this
form of attribution of conscious experience as a conceptualisation of the raw experience - which
is similar to the attribution of tri-dimensionality to the sides of Penrose triangle. With an
exhaustive examination of this experience one can picture that the ventriloquist is the cause
of the puppet's movements and words and one then recognizes the illusory character to the
attribution of conscious experience to the puppet. As a matter of fact, T.Nagel's formula rules
out this case, for there is nothing it is like to be a ventriloquist's puppet.
The observation of M.Grazziano is the basis of his Attention schema theory [G15] of con-
sciousness, which is summarized as follows:
"In a nutshell, the theory proposes that subjective awareness is the brain's internal model of the
process of attention."
What is common to the objects which we conceptualise as 'conscious' - or more accurately
'aware' - is that they exhibit some dynamics of sensibility (in a sense that the object reacts
specically) towards the presence of other objects that I perceive, which resembles the process
of direction of attention that I execute towards these objects. The idea of this theory is thus
that the illusory attribution (and not necessarily the attribution of consciousness after careful
introspection) of conscious awareness coincides with the perception this type of dynamics. I
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think that this attribution works as a hypothesis produced automatically by the human brain
in order to react rapidly to the potential presence of other animals (which may be dangerous);
a hypothesis which explains the perceived dynamics of sensibility, and is projected onto the
organism and exists in it in a similar way as the center of gravity exists in a massive object. The
fact that ultimately conscious experience is not attributed to the puppet may come from other
factors which are examined after consideration of the hypothetically conscious object, such as
the property of autonomy - the causes of the object's behavior systematically have a part which
lies within the object. It can also be the fact that it is not possible to augment the objects in
my experience to which the organism is specically sensible, by designating an object it is not
specically sensible to already.
The kind of organisms whose conceptualisation as 'conscious' resists to this analysis are ones
for which I can conceive that there should be something it is like to be the organism. However the
conception that an organism has a conscious experience may come after observation of various
experiences in which this organism appears: for instance I can imagine a bacteria-like organism
which reacts specically to objects that I identify in experiences I have in which it appears, and
I will naturally 'explain' to myself this behavior as the one of a conscious organism [this, by the
way, may be an argument in favour of a mild panpsychism].
The dierence between the illusory attribution of conscious experience and the attribution
according to T.Nagel comes after this careful investigation of an experience or a set of experiences
in which the organism appears. The organisms for which I can conceive that there is something
it is like to be it are the ones for which I can, out of the observation of the organism with its
'environment', nd a 'transcendental formula' (a sequence of transcendental operations) to apply
on my own way to interact with my personal world in order to obtain the kind of experiences
that I hypothesize it has (which is not necessarily the kind it actually has).
After this denition T.Nagel proposes in his paper to consider the case of the bat; it is
possible to doubt that bats do not have conscious experience because this experience is not as
such perceptible to any human. However if one does, there is no reason not to doubt in the same
way that other human beings have conscious experience. Ruling out solipsism, one has to accept
that bats have conscious experience. T.Nagel chose the example of the bat for the following
reason:
"I have said that the essence of the belief that bats have experience is that there is something
that it is like to be a bat. [...] But bat sonar, though clearly a form of perception, is not similar
in its operation to any sense that we possess, and there is no reason to suppose that it is
subjectively like anything we can experience or imagine."
The experience of the bat as such thus poses a problem not only to science but human
thoughts in general to access things-in-themselves, as they 'really' are.
II.3.2  Introspective exploration
It is clear that one can not access to the the kind experiences that the bat has as such,
and only as human beings can imagine it, through a series of transcendental operations on the
human way of experiencing [as T.Nagel formulate these, addition, substraction, or combinations
of them]. On the other hand this case can serve as an example of how one may attempt to
conceive how experiencing as a bat may be; for that one can not restrict oneself to straightforward
introspection. For instance I may concieve the formula that the bat does not experience visually,
however by picturing the spatiality of the environment out of sounds that it produces and 'hear'
back, suggesting a series of transformation on my own way of experiencing. For instance I can
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try to blind myself and use only my voice to see how I may represent myself the spatiality of
my environment - of course the conceptualisation of this experiencing should take time. Such
a conceptualisation may be extrapolated to the bat and as a hypothesis be confronted to the
observable behavior of the bat.
As I describe it, this kind of exploration may only provide subjective and not objective
results. However any objective knowledge can come out only of rst exploring and experiencing;
this exploration should be considered as a rst step, and objectivity should be constructed
intersubjectively with time. In fact this exploration should come with a revision of the notion of
objectivity itself: as T.Nagel puts it, "It may be more accurate to think of objectivity as a direction
in which the understanding can travel.". There is no other way, for the notion of objectivity that
we collectively currently hold is that which in the experience is not relative to any viewpoint,
and because the object of study is here the viewpoint itself, "any shift to greater objectivity
-that is, less attachment to a specic viewpoint-does not take us nearer to the real nature of the
phenomenon: it takes us farther away from it.". For T.Nagel this pursuit of a "more objective
understanding of the mental in its own right" may force us to set aside temporarily the relation
between the mind and the brain. I think that this does not have to be the case, but we should
see this relation not as something to construct yet but a tool to direct one's introspection (I shall
make this more precise in the following).
On the other hand I believe that conceiving how bats in particular are experiencing is not
enough to understand the 'consciousness' that we may have in common; considering conscious-
ness through the spectrum of the structure of the experiencing subject, the method of exploration
should be to consider all the possible forms that consciousness may take - in other words all the
possible structures. Understanding consciousness would be to understand this space of possibili-
ties, for consciousness as such is what is left after removing the form of it. By way of comparison,
religion takes you to explore certain forms of consciousness, in order to reach one particular form
accessible to human beings; its purpose is not to explore the space of possibilities in a systematic
manner, and it may be dogmatic in the way it leads to this particular form. How to explore
this space ? Let me make an analogy here: if I ask you to close your eyes and give you an
object asking you to tell me what shape it has - let us assume it is a torus for the example -
I am guessing you will take the object in your hands and touch it on one particular place and
then move the hand around this place, progressively mapping the feel of touch to a visual map,
until you nd this representation 'closed', meaning that for a time subjectively long enough, you
always come back, according to the constructed representation, to a place you already have been
to. With this representation in mind you can tell me condently that the shape is a torus. By
contrast if you had touched the object on one point, and then another far from this one, etc, it
might be dicult to arrive at a faithful representation of the shape. I think it may be dicult
even to direct your nger to a point of the object, so why not beginning with the one you hold
it through ? - what corresponds to this point is the object of the following section.
The way a bat experiences represents only one point of this shape. T.Nagel also suggests
near the end of his paper some speculations on how to arrive at conceptualizing other forms of
experiencing beginning with humans (for it should be easier I guess). For instance: how could a
deaf person explain a blind one how it feels to hear sounds ? An answer to such a question can
serve as a criterion for a right conceptualization. However I do not see clearly that the diculty
would be reduced. One may generalize this approach and try to conceptualise systematically how
human beings which live in dierents 'worlds' can explain what it is like to live in their 'world';
however I believe that in this study one can not reasonably expect to come down to elementary
concepts: this will be the object of an other article.
Exploring the shape, and conceptualising 'patch by patch', a possible way to conceptualise
consciousness as such should appear as the set of invariants of the conceptualisation of patches.
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Digression: Thinking about the type of speculations that T.Nagel proposed, I thought about
the exclusion 'axiom' of integrated information theory. As a matter of fact the theoretical signi-
cance of this 'axiom' is related to the dimension of the set of possible 'geometrical characteristics'
for the support of an experience, as it tells that the experience could be more extended or less
extended than it actually is. This signicance shrinks when one considers considering slightly
more abstract 'geometries' for the visual experience for instance. Let us consider the following
question: what does it feel like to have a visual eld having the shape of a sphere ? As a matter
of fact it appears quite dicult to imagine (why is that so ?). Physically I could imagine that I
have eyes all around my head, that the perceptive elds of these eyes overlap leaving no whole and
all together form a sphere, and that the direction of my attention can move from one eye to the
other; however I can not imagine that these partial vision elds are given all at once. I can only
discover the topology of my whole vision eld through experience itself and causal considerations
about its content: when I go around the sphere and come back to the same point, the way I know
it is the same point as the one I departed from is that what I see at these two points is always
the same. On the other hand I can easily construct a 'spot-like structure' like the one computed
in [HT19] which is supported by a sphere; this shows (if it was needed) that this 'structure' is not
essential to the phenomenology of space.
II.4  A.Turing
I shall begin the exploration on a form of experiencing which corresponds to the denition
of A.Turing's computing machines. The reason for this is the fact that the human mind can
simulate any possible computing machine is apprehensible formally and intersubjectively, as well
as that it 'approximate' in a certain sense how the mind works.
Here again I would like to rule out some preconceptions and fast critics on how computing
machines may be used in order to progress in the understanding of the mind. I would like,
to begin with, to detach the approach I am dening in this paper from the idea that one can
understand the mind in terms of machines as we usually conceive them - in particular computers.
As a matter of fact, even such a machine is a nite collection of causal relations (corresponding
to logical gates) to which is reduced a physical system constructed to support in a stable way
these causal relations. I think that it is possible to study the mind introspectively and reveal how
the mind works mechanistically, meaning that it can be described in terms of causal relations,
but there is not reason to think that these mechanics can be realised by a nite machine - a
nite collection of causal relations. Furthermore I do not think that it is possible with current
understanding of the mind and the brain, to assume that the way we experience the world can be
exhaustively described based on the mechanics of the brain - in other words we can not assume
that causation in the mind can be reduced to causation related to a certain substance in this
mind (the material). I fact I will take computing machines as a 'fundamental mode' of how
the mind works without any hypothesis on how far this fundamental mode is from the general
structure of the experiencing subject.
II.4.1  Computing machines and the human mind
As a matter of fact it matters at this point to come back to the point of view of A.Turing
in his paper Computing machinery and intelligence and see how it can be tweaked in order to
understand better the mind in its own right. The general idea of A.Turing back then was about
the possibility to answer the question: can machines think ? - a question which would lead to
a more precise denition of what thinking is. He proposed that if we can ever build a machine
which can interact intellectually with a human as if it was a human from the point of view of
the human, then this machine actually thinks.
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One can nd the rst denition of computing machines in Turing's article On Computable
Numbers, with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem. One may notice that Turing takes
these machines as a faithful representation of the mind of "a man in the process of computing
a real number". This is convincing for the mind in the process of computing, in particular for
the human memory in this process is limited (here memory refers to what the man in question
can hold consciously in mind during the process), which corresponds to the niteness of the
set of possible states for the machine. Furthermore one can see the tape of the machine as
the simplication of the set of paper sheets that the man in the process of computing uses to
compute, which consists in reading and writing on these sheets symbols according to certain nite
set of rules, which may be written on the rst sheet of paper - it is clear that this simplication
does not aect the way computation is done. In this article his notion of computing machines is
simplied to t the mathematical analysis, while in the other article Computing machinery and
intelligence, he provides a way to think about how the machine may be decomposed to t the
description of how the mind actually works in the process of computing: the machine is there
decomposed into a 'store', where information is stored and consists in the tape and a part of
memory in the mind, an 'executive unit ', which executes serially individual operations, and the
'control ', which ensures that the operations are executed correctly by the executive unit.
With a minute of introspection I can see that this description is correct. In a sense it
was possible for Turing to transcript 'how the mind works' in mathematical terms (causal or
functional if you will) in this precise situation of the computing process. However it is not clear
that the functioning of the whole mind can ever be accurately described as the functioning of
a computing machine, which is the view that Turing defended in Computing machinery and
intelligence [Turing]. This idea has resisted and still resists (in the philosophy of D.Dennett for
instance), for various reasons amongst which I think the eectivity of the concept of computing
machines in mathematics played an important role. I believe that the most robust philosophical
argument (although negative) for his view is the counter-argument to the (4) Argument from
consciousness (page 14). The argument is basically the following: machines can not reproduce
certain human behaviors which require consciousness, such as writing a sonnet because of the
thoughts and emotions felt, and more straightforwardly, a machine can not feel anything. It is
interesting to note that the response of Turing displays ideas similar to the ones of the later
article of T.Nagel. His counter argument uses the rejection of solipsism: if a machine is built
which reproduces human behaviour exactly, there is no reason to doubt that the machine is
conscious without doubting that other humans are. This argument is eective but relies on
what I would like to call the realization hypothesis, that such a machine can ever be built. In
particular it should also reproduce not only human behaviour in a restricted context but also
human existence, otherwise the argument breaks as there still lies the dierence between the
illusory consciousness attributed to the ventriloquist's puppet and the one attributed to other
humans. It is clear that Turing was aware of this aw in the argument, however his purpose was
to question what should be done in the meantime:
"The only really satisfactory support [...] will be provided by waiting for the end of the century
and then doing the experiment described. But what can we say in the meantime ? What steps
should be taken now if the experiment is to be successful ?".
Near the end of his paper he provides more positive arguments for his view, developping the
idea of learning machines, which can be taught by humans in order to pass the test. This led to
the emergence of the eld ofmachine learning and its multiple branches; despite its achievements,
however, machine learning does not enable machines to pass Turing's test yet. My belief is that
machine learning can be considered as a good tool to program performative algorithms eciently,
but it is far from able to reproduce human behavior exactly. As a matter of fact even if a machine
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does realize a certain work more eciently than humans this does not make it closer to human
being as it actually is, but farther. Turing responded this argument with the idea of introducing
articial errors in the rules followed by the machine, but the way the machine does errors, notice
and correct them does also matter. Also I believe that an important barrier to overcome is the
one of heteronomy : machines can not nd by themselves the means of their subsistance and use
them without a human.
I think that the other arguments of Turing can be deconstructed as well, however the point
I would like to make here is that maybe the most ecient way even to reproduce the human
mind from the outside is to understand how it is from the inside (introspection). For this the
process itself of modeling a part of how the mind works in the particular situation of computing
on computing machines can serve in order to extend this modeling onto a priori dierent objects,
which can take into account for instance the way the human mind does mechanical operations
which actual machines can not do: for instance the constant re-denition of its rules of conduct,
mentioned by Turing in the point (8) The argument from informality of behaviour (page 21). In
fact the counter argument of Turing in this part against the conclusion that humans can not be
machines is that rules of contuct should be dierenciated from 'laws of behaviors': there might
actually be such mechanical laws which root the denition of humans' redenition of rules of
conduct. It is not clear however that these laws can be reproduced by machines as we currently
conceive them.
II.4.2  Non-reductive mathematics of the experiencing subject
The description that Turing has made of the human mind in the process of computing as
a nite mechanical process (the computing machine) and speculatively extended to the whole
mind has played, I believe, an important role in the collective adoption of physicalism - which
I take to be dened as the idea that the mind can be described completely in physical terms,
that is in terms only of causal relations between abstract objects (which are experiencial objects
substracted from a priori inessential phenomenal aspects) which may eventually be represented
to the mind by itself via phenomenal experience. Although the article of T.Nagel is a strong
attack against physicalism, I believe that the following sentence is a rather convincing debunking
argument against it:
"A physical scientist does not introduce awareness (sensation or perception) into his theories,
and having thus removed the mind from nature, he cannot expect to nd it there." -
E.Schrödinger (1958).
For the physical scientist to neglect a priori inessential aspects of experience - inessential
relative to a practical use of an understanding of reality - has been natural, for the conceptu-
alisation of a priori essential aspects of this experience has been made possible precisely by the
focalisation resulting from neglecting. However it is this precisely which led to the separation of
the mental and the physical (dualism, and with it the diculty of thinking causation between
mental and physical [K20]), and furthermore physicalism. I think that in order to understand the
structure of the experiencing subject, it is not possible to set a priori that any of the substances
in the mind is ontologically prior to the others - in other words we should include back inessential
aspects in the theory and rethink causal relations between essential and inessential aspects of
reality. We will see both types of aspects as coexisting in the reality - if I am interpreting well,
this is similar to what C.List proposes in his many-worlds theory of consciousness [L21], that
rst-personal worlds coexists in a common reality. I do not think that positing this coexistence
consists in avoiding the question of how the mental appears out of the physical: after all, the
problem itself is generated by physicalism. Moreover we do not really have a response for how
the physical world appears from the void. Why should it be dierent for the mental ?
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In fact it is relatively simple to see how causation can happen between mental events of
dierent natures: when I instanciate in my mind an algorithm, let's say "walking in the streets
of Kraków", I hold in my mind (most of the time unconsciously once I have learnt these rules
of conduct) the following rules: i) when encountering a road on my way, look at the trac light
on the other side. ii) if the light is green, cross the road iii) else, wait until the light becomes
green iv) when so, cross the road. In this context it is fair to say that the mental event "red
trac light" is 'a' cause of me stopping. On the same model one can imagine that similar causal
relations as 'laws of behavior' instead of rules of conduct. This simple example resembles to the
computing machine (there is a store, an executive unit, a control), with a clear dierence from
the formalisation of the computing machine: while the later consists in a nite collection of causal
relations between events which are abstracted from actual mental events to keep only the idea that
they are all dierent from each other, the former consists in a nite collection of causal relations
between actual mental events. I shall call the former a mental computing machine. It has
been natural for A.Turing to extract from it the causal relations to form a mathematical model
of computing, for they are the only essential aspects for computational power ; the simplied
version of the computing machine can be also put in relation with other mathematical objects and
integrated in the mathematical discourse (in particular with the development of computability
theory). Furthermore for externalizing a certain mental algorithm, it is natural to extract from
it only causal relations, for this way it is possible to replace mental events with events that
are possible to control, ensuring the stability of the algorithm's execution. The fact that these
causal relations are realised in my experience by other subjects is also a strong factor for the
attribution of meaning to this formalisation (in a very similar way to M.Graziano's attention
schema). However if we are to understand the mechanics of the mental in its own right, we
should reverse the operation of extraction and base this understanding on mental computing
machines.
On the basis of this ontological equalisation, I believe it is possible to approach mathemati-
cally the study of the experiencing subject; not in the sense of an application of mathematical
formalism, but in developping a mathematical reasoning from the psychological foundations of
the practice of mathematics to experiencing itself - I shall make clearer the terms 'psychological
foundations' later with the reading of J.Hadamard. As Q.Meillassoux expresses it in his book,
After nitude: an essay on the necessity of contingency [Meillassoux], the change that Galileo
has operated in the use of mathematics compared to his predecessors was not to nd mathe-
matical patterns in the experience, but to think that the description of certain experiences (the
movement of massive bodies) can be 'exhausted ' mathematically - meaning that every aspect of
such experience can enter as a part of a mathematical model of it. I understand this 'exhaustion'
in the same way as the term exhaustion I used in my previous article [G20], meaning that a
delimited experience can be thought as the assembling of distinguished objects that it contains,
in some spatial relations and causal relations (including rules of evolution). I think that in order
to study the structure of the experiencing subject, one has to make a similar extension of the
operability of mathematics. On the other hand I do not believe that it is clear yet what kind
of formalisation this should lead to, which is the reason why I like to try multiple ways to do
so at this time. Concerning what in experiencing the operability should be extended on, I think
that should be rst the set of transcendental operations through which the subject relate to
experience (navigating 'in' it, designating and isolating elements of this experience, transforming
imaginatively contingent aspects of these elements and connecting them in the instanciation of a
mental algorithm, etc), as well as the structure of the "mental space" [K20] - for which the partial
knowledge of the structure of the brain can serve as a tool for introspection, providing hypotheses
on this structure that can be veried or falsied introspectively. In this direction, I think that
the particular architecture of processing of information in the human brain should be the result
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of contraints (I believe of dynamical nature) applied on the living compared to machines (spatial
constraints as well as autonomy). Similar constraints as well as the information mechanisms that
they result in (I think in particular that emotional responses serve the situated focalisation on
the body's imperatives and are included in overarching attention strategy) applied to the mind
functioning as a computing machine may also serve as a tool for introspection.
Focusing on how mental computing machines are instanciated and operate should enable the
introspective exhaustion of particular situations of experiencing, in particular how transcendental
operations are realised in these situations and their spatiality 'in' the mind - I see this focalisation
as similar to the focalisation operated by physics on a priori essential aspects of reality. We could
see the realizability of computing machines by the human mind as analogical to an axiom, for
it has a similar foundation role. However I would like to deviate from this analogy, for the
phenomenological use of it is dierent: I think of it more as an introspective 'gateway'.
I should insist here on the idea that for understanding how mental computing machines
operate in the mind, one has to consider how they are in the mind, "coming back to things
themselves" (phenomenology), where here the things in question are the computing machines. By
way of comparison, absurdities in logics (Russel's paradox for instance) appeared when the mental
act of collection was removed from the denition of a set, and disappeared when considering it
back (no act of collection can construct Russell's 'set', it is only a language construction similar
to the "square which is a circle"). We should come back similarly to how precisely (by which
transcendental operations) the computing machines are assembled and executed in the mind -
explaining in a sense how A.Turing introspectively arrived at his model.
Digression: I think that it is interesting to wonder why there is a dierence in the attribution
of conscious experience to a computing machine observed while functioning (no attribution) and
other humans or animals (attribution), while they both exhibit an attention schema. I think that
this means there should be an additional factor than the attention schema which is essential to
the attribution of conscious experience. I think that one factor is what I mentioned earlier: the
specic sensibility to objects to which I am specically sensible. I shall add that these objects
should be 'close' to me in the sense that the sensibility is not articially constructed (such as the
symbols the computing machine 'pays attention' to).
II.5  J.Searle
I think that the above digression should shed some light on J.Searle's Chinese room argu-
ment [Searle], which has an important role in the introspective method that I am searching to
develop, although not as an argument but as an introspective technique.
This argument is meant, roughly, to convince that 'instantiating a computer program is never
by itself a sucient condition of intentionality '; one consequence posited by J.Searle of this
argument is that 'any attempt literally to create intentionality articially (strong AI) could not
succeed just by designing programs but would have to duplicate the causal powers of the human
brain'. This consequence can be extended a forciori to replace intentionality with 'consciousness'
- meaning essential aspects of consciousness as such.
This argument goes roughly like this: imagine there is a program which can, provided a
text written in English, translate it in Chinese (here replace this language by any one you don't
understand at all, let's say Swahili for instance), in such a way that the translation is convincing
for persons who speak the two languages uently. Imagine then that you are in a closed room
and assigned to execute the program step by step on a text provided by persons out of the room
through a hole and then output the obtained text in Chinese through another hole. It seems
clear there that although you don't understand Chinese, the room as perceived from the outside
passes the test for the specic assignement of translating a text in English to a text in Chinese.
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J.Searle's conclusion is that although such a machine can act as if it understood Chinese
language, it does not imply necessarily that it does understand it. For J.Searle, the attribution
of some faculties - such as understanding, also posited by R.Penrose [P20] as a dierence between
minds and machines as we conceive them for the same reason as J.Searle that it lies beyond the
execution of a nite set of rules - comes only from the tendency of the mind to project onto
machines which exhibit similar observable behaviors which are only loosely related to these
faculties. In other words, in this situation the attribution of understanding (as well as other
faculties of the mind related to intentionality) is illusory.
I think that computing machines (I believe used implicitely by J.Searle) are particularly
suitable for this argument because it is possible to identify a point of view 'in' the machine
(the machine head which is moving on the tape), from which I can stand to imagine what it
is like to be such a machine - or more precisely 'what it should, or could, be like' (once the
realisability hypothesis is supposed to be satised) - otherwise it would be dicult to picture
this out of my own experience. After taking the position of this point of view, I am able to
compare the conception I can form of what it is like to be the computing machine, which in fact
is a structure of experiencing (and not a particular experience or series of experiences), and the
structure of my experiencing. It is this introspective comparison which renders more present to
my mind some elements of the dierence between these two structures of experiencing. I believe
that J.Searle chose understanding for the imediacy of the argument, but this exposes it to the
critics because 'understanding' (he uses also the notion of 'belief') - as he recognizes it himself
- does not refer to a precise notion. I believe that the simple presence to the mind of an object
to which the words refer, as it is required for understanding or beliefs, would be sucient: I
do not understand the Chinese symbols because I do not have in mind any object it refers to.
In fact when someone translates a language from another, this person uses a mental machinery
which to each word in the text to be translated associates a mental content and make these
contents present to the mind altogether for the words of a sentence respecting its structure, in
order to arrive at the representation of a situation. Then this person can nd words in the
other language in order to describe exhaustively this situation and assemble them in a sentence
respecting the structure of the mental situation. It is this mental machinery which is suppressed
in the conception of translation programs. Furthermore it is conceivable to design a machine
which 'understands' Chinese in rened sense - for instance it could be able to answer questions
on the individual symbols and words that it manipulates, just as the questions a teacher asks
the student to verify they understood - but there will still be missing the presence of a reference.
Besides, the computing machine model can not render the variations in the presence of an object
to the mind (for instance the discovery of this object, meaning the perception of an object which
I can not identify with another object I can conceive or extract from a past experience) or the
possible causal interactions between the conscious and the unconscious.
I would like to see this introspective comparison as a tool in the process of progressive 'ap-
proximation' of the human structure of experiencing by nite mechanistical accounts. There is
no reason a priori to think that this approximation process can exhaust its object in nite time
- this is the obstacle of potential inniteness posited by R.Penrose [P20], and mentioned earlier
by A.Turing [Turing] as a potentiality. The reason is that a better approximation may lead to
more accurate introspection, for instance the presence of an element in the dierence between
the two structures of experiencing (to be still conceptualised) that was not perceptible earlier in
the process.
J.Searle's argument received several critics, some of which can be found in [Searle]. I would
like to spend some time here on analysing some critics in order to defend its use in an introspective
method, although it does not meet some criteria of deniteness. I recommend reading the one
of R.P.Abelson (page 8) for it is quite amusing proof that the name Yale is not a synonym
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of brightness - also, I hold as a hypothesis that some "scientists" may identify themselves so
much with machines that they need them, in order to preserve their ego, to have the faculty of
understanding. More seriously, the one of D.Dennett (page 12), which I take as representing the
opposition, bears on the adaptability and the correlated ambiguity of the thought experiment
(which allows an 'intuition pump'). I think that the ambiguity can be resolved by distinguishing
three types of possible variations: i) the realizability of a certain assigment is considered without
the constraint of time; ii) the constraint of time is applied and forces the parallelisation of certain
operations; iii) the constraint of time is applied and prevents the possibility of the program to
be executed. For type iii) nothing can be concluded, although it is reasonable to extrapolate
from the two other ones. For type i), it is clear that the program can be realised by a (serial)
computing machine manipulating symbols in the set {0, 1} on the model of the initial thought
experiment and it is clear that I do not understand what the program is doing (its meaning) unless
I actively research this, but this is not part of the thought experiment. This applies in particular
to deep learning algorithms. For instance let us consider the algorithm which consists in training
a neural network to distinguish pictures which have a 'smurglof ' in them and ones which do not
and then apply it on a particular picture. If I execute this algorithm serially, considering the
bits of information that the pictures contain one by one, I will never form, during the training,
a concept of what patterns (the smurglofs) the pictures contain that actually distinguish them.
The output of the algorithm informs me if it contains a smurglof or not, but I do not have any
idea of what this means because the word does not refer to anything in my experience. For type
ii), the parallelisation of operations can lead to the construction of such references. For instance
if I execute the above algorithm by looking at the pictures (not bit by bit), I will naturally form
a concept of what a smurglof is and actually understand what the word means. In this case the
thought experiment has a less straightforward eect because some eort is needed to see that
the point may still be valid. The reason is that the construction of reference is there accidental
and not necessarily related to the execution of the algorithm itself. What this means is that it is
in principle possible to inhibit this construction and arrive at a similar conclusion as in the case
of type i) arguments.
It seems that the changes operated on the initial argument, in order to exhibit what is essential
to it and make its meaning clearer (J.Searle) or in order to prove that it is possible to arrive
at dierent conclusions from the ones of J.Searle with similar arguments (D.Dennett), consist in
distorting the argument to make it of type i) or ii). I think that while the type i) arguments
are valid, they do not cover all the possible situations: in particular the conclusions to be drawn
from type ii) are unclear without a better understanding of understanding - and this leads us to
further creative introspection.
In any case it is clear that the purpose of J.Searle is not to deny that minds are mechanical,
only to doubt that articial intelligence is useful for the mind-body problem: "I begin with that
old chestnut of a question: 'Could a machine think?' The answer is, obviously, yes. We are
precisely such machines. 'Yes, but could an artifact, a man-made machine, think?'" [Searle]. In
fact it is in principle possible to describe the mind in terms of programs, however not programs
which can be implemented in machines as we conceive them, but only describe causal relations
between mental events. This mechanistical account would not exhaust experience (for mental
events themselves are not all causal relations). In fact I like to treat causation as only a layer
of the experience, other layers including particular types of phenomenal experiences (visual or
auditive) as well as transcendental operations on phenomenal experience. I think that it is
reasonable to approach consciousness through the spectrum of some of these layers, but not,
like integrated information theory, to think that these layers exhaust experience. For instance
constructing a correspondance between the structure of the human brain and the causal layer of
experience based on isomorphism of structures may produce hypotheses on how the other layers
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may be related to the physical, or on the 'location' of the point of view; this can enhanced by
an exhaustion of what in the experience is structurally analogical to the brain before moving
to parts which are not. I arrived at the idea that phenomenal experience exists in additional
dimensions to the four dimensions of space-time - in fact if you think about it a little bit you may
see that this statement is almost trivial, but I think that it can lead to some interesting change
of ideas. In particular I believe that it is possible that the organisms to which we attribute
conscious experience exhibit information integration in a way that can not be conceived to
occur inside the four-dimensional space-time, for dimensionality constrains the possibilities for
information processing and its organisation. Such an organism would need activity in additional
dimensions (conscious experience) in order to integrate information the way it does. In this
sense, an organism may have conscious experience only when passing a certain threshold of
information integration, eliminating panpsychism. The quantity of information integration may
characterize organisms having conscious experience (the ones which integrate information over a
certain threshold), but not how this experience is related to the physical. One way to do that may
be to search, provided a certain apparent integration in the four-dimensional space-time, how
this integration can be realised with a minimal number of additional dimensions and ressources
in these dimensions.
Digression: I believe that one source of D.Dennett's illusionism lies in his article Where
am I ? [D78], in which he proposed, through a narrative, a thought experiment which consists
in imagining a surgical procedure allowing to separate the brain from the remainder of the body
without altering phenomenal experience. In this context it is dicult to nd an answer to the
question 'Where am I ?'. Although D.Dennett develops his thought experiment further, in this
situation both ideas that I am in my brain and that I am in my body are intenable. I think on the
other hand that the confusion comes from the idea that 'I' am in the four-dimensional space-time,
wether it is thought in the classical or relativity way, which occurs with the identication of the
interior of the mental space with the interior of the skull.
II.6  H.Putnam
Along the approximation process that I mentioned in the last section, there are methodological
temptations that I would like to keep away from. One of them, rooting H.Putnam's functionalism,
is to approximate the actual mind using functional equivalence to identify mental states to
functional states of the physical part of the organism, in order to circumvent introspection - an
idea which probably roots itself the project of integrated information theory to relate mental
states to parts of the causal structure of the brain). I will explain here why I think this is a
mistake, reading through a pair of papers of H.Putnam.
II.6.1  About the identity between dierent mental states and the functional
hypothesis
In his article The nature of mental states [P67], H.Putnam defends a form of identication
between physical states and mental states which allows to talk about mental states through
physical states while ruling out a complete identity. For instance for H.Putnam, temperature
(mental state) is mean molecular kinetic energy (physical state). Of course these two concepts
are dierent because temperature refers to a sensation while mean molecular kinetic energy
refers to a mathematical formula - in fact you may replace in this formula the energy with
a hypothetical elementary sensation of energy, and this results in a transcendental formula not
reduced to causal terms, but this is not the way it is usuall thought. In fact some arguments have
been provided against this complete identication, such as the fact that it is possible for someone
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to experience a mental state without knowing that the correlated physical state happened. I nd
these amusing because the formulation of the sentence itself relies on the distinction between
two dierent entities - a distinction for which one has to use introspection, without which the
question of the relation between mental states and physical states makes no sense.
On the other hand they are identical in a sense that is close to the meaning of the equal sign
(=) in mathematics. Let us for instance take the equality 3× 15 = 9× 5. One can think about
the two sides of the equality, 3× 15 and 9× 5, as classes of instances of mental processes. Take
a mental object - for the example let's take a mathematical point. The rst of these processes
consists in considering a group of 15 points and 'copy-paste' this group of points three times
on a mental board. The result of this process is the number of points that you can see on the
board. The second process is similar but takes a group of 5 points and copy-paste it 9 times.
The processes are dierent but they are equivalent because they have the same result. You can
also think of this in causal terms: if the result of the rst process is the integer n then the
result of the second process is n, and reciprocally; then if you consider embedding one of these
two processes in a larger one, you can choose any of them for they are functionally equivalent :
whatever is caused or causes one respectively is caused or causes the other. This is the meaning
of the equality 3 × 15 = 9 × 5: the two processes are equivalent related to their further use in
mathematical constructions, and thus can be considered as completely identical in this context.
Transposed to mental states and physical states: the temperature and mean molecular kinetic
energy are not identical but are functionally equivalent and thus can be identied.
This is the conception of identity that H.Putnam uses in order to render conceivable the
identication between dierent mental states (in particular strictly mental states and physical
ones). With this type of identication in mind, he proposes that mental states are identical to
functional states of the organism, meaning a local (in time) set of rules of conduct, in other
words causal relations. In principle the interest of this identication is that causal relations can
be computed on causal accounts of the organism, from a third-person point of view. In order to
support this hypothesis, which I shall call the functional hypothesis, he rules out other proposals
of identication of similar nature: i) the idea that mental states are physical states (of the brain);
ii) the one that they are behavioral patterns.
The hypothesis i) is improbable, according to H.Putnam, for it is improbable that evolution
could lead to only one physical correlate of a mental state, let alone for all mental states. This is
the idea of multiple realizability (by physical states) of mental states: a physical state can cause
a mental state, but this is not reciprocal - in particular it may not be the only cause of this
mental state. On the other hand it is possible to prevent an animal to exhibit any reaction to
the induction of pain, while this animal still feels pain: this proves that the hypothesis ii) is not
acceptable. Along the same line of thought I could add to the argument of Putnam that one
can also simulate the behavior of someone in pain (there lies also the threat of illusion: here we
come back to the remarks on M.Grazziano's ideas). This means that there can not be any causal
relation between a behavioral pattern and a mental content such as the feeling of pain.
These arguments do not aect the identication with functional states, for it is not in principle
possible to simulate these functional states, and that functional states satisfy multiple realizabil-
ity. However this hypothesis is convincing only because the means to refute it are lacking: how
do we mesure a functional state, provided the fact that causation and furthermore functional
equivalence are unstable by approximation ? - let us note that the situation here is dierent
than the one of mathematics, for in this discipline the experiencial context is xed beforehand.
As a matter of fact, integrated information theory suers from similar problems - I have argued
in this direction in another article [G20]. More precisely the problem is that we do not have a
distance which evaluates how far the functional structure of the approximation made of the or-
ganism considered is from the functional structure of the actual organism and thus how relevant
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the computations made on models of the organism actually are. I think that this problem arises
when attempting to circumvent introspection, for this distance in question (although obscure) is
provided by introspection itself.
I also believe that it is possible to recover the idea that mental states are related to functional
states of the whole organism with the thought that mental states lie in additional dimensions,
in the sense that they consist in causal intermediates between physical states (in particular
executing the function of integration). In this setting, understanding the relation between the
mental space and the physical space consists in having a faifthful representation of how they
are spatially articulated - without this I believe there is no way to explain how a mental state
and a functional state may be functionally equivalent. This articulation can a priori take many
forms, but I think that an identication based on causal equivalence similar to the one used by
Putnam between mental states which lie in dierent dimensions - such as what we usually call
the mental and what we usually call the physical - can be only partial - where a systematisation
of the identication would result in a form of physicalism - and through causal chain which go
through the intersection of these dimensions (here I use the term dimension for the mathematical
term of vector space, which, for mathematicians, should make more sense of the use of the
other term intersection). In this point of view there can be still a experiencial (meaning in
the time of experience) equivalence between some mental states and some functional ones, but
this equivalence may be ultimately reducible to an equivalence between parts of them which are
limits of elements of respective dimensions approached from these dimensions - and there can be
a complete identity, not only experiencial but absolute. Furthermore the functional equivalent
of a mental state could be necessary but not sucient for the presence of the mental state.
II.6.2  On the criticism of L.Shapiro
In order to be more precise on the position I adopt relatively to the thoughts of H.Putnam,
I would like to spend some time on the article of L.Shapiro, Multiple realizations [S20] in order
to separate in the criticism of functionalism the aspects I believe in and the others I do not.
Ultimately the aim of this article seems to be a redirection in the denition of special sciences,
meaning the sciences which are concerned not with physics themselves but with particular phys-
ical systems, or kinds of physical systems. According to L.Shapiro, special sciences should not
nd a priori laws of functional kinds - where the function denes the kind of systems studied - but
focus on empirical grouping of systems of the same kind in order for a comparison between the
particulars to shed light on the reasons for the form of the realizations of the function. In order
to support this view, he questions the idea of multiple realizability as proposed by H.Putnam
and then generalized by J.Fodor to defend from attempts to reduce special sciences to physics.
The text itself lets appear two grounds for the criticism of the notion of multiple realizability.
The rst one is related to the problem I mentioned above of the approximation or the distance
between the representation - in particular functional - and the objects of experience - the organ-
isms considered. There is a tendency, considering machines as we conceive them, to indentify the
machine as a functional description of the object whose presence is experienced and the object
itself (this tendency is similar to the one I mentioned in my other article between mathematical
objects as concepts and how they are instanciated in the experience, a tendency enhanced by
the fact that there is a one-to-one correspondance between them). As L.Shapiro puts it: "But
computers are not machine tables, nor are they intended to be machine tables. Rather, computers
are devices for implementing the sequence of functional relations that a machine table describes."
In fact for the machines that we build, this identication is natural because, in the circumstances
of their use, the table describes accurately all the possible behaviors of the machine. Problems
appear when using analogy between machines that we build and natural mechanisms, usually on
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the basis that they are both mechanical - however we should dierenciate machines and mecha-
nisms! The dierence is that in the case of natural mechanism, the identication does not hold
because the description is only partial: we do not have access to all the possible behaviors of
the mechanism. Institutions for instance work mechanically, but they are not machines for the
description of how an institution works concerns only a subset of all the situations of 'use'. For
instance the human beings which 'compose' the institution have emotions which are neglected in
the description of the purpose of the institution and under particular circumstances can aect
its function in a way that is not predicted by the description. The situation is similar for natural
mechanisms; in fact L.Shapiro uses the example of two computers executing the same operations
in a particular sequence of events but have a dierent computational power: the dierence is not
seen in current situations of use but the dierence may appear in some other possible situations.
For L.Shapiro, "Once we see the distinction between a description of a system and the system
described, the temptation to move from claims of functional isomorphism to the truth of MRT
[multiple realizability thesis] loses its allure." The reason is that if we do not have access to a
complete description of a natural mechanism, how can one judge that two of these mechanisms
are really dierent realizations of the same kind ? For instance it is not clear what would make
an octopus eye and a human eye dierent realizations of the same function and not two dif-
ferent human eyes dierent realizations ? A similar argument is posited by L.Shapiro [about
corkscrews and their colors], but my point here is to stress that the problem of multiple realiz-
ability here comes not from the thought of the natural as mechanical but of as descriptible with
nite machines.
The second ground is the ambiguity of the notion of functional description: how should
the function of a natural mechanism be described ? There are two possibilities to do so: else
we only look at a function in terms of its input and outputs - the description is of what the
mechanism does - or the description includes the particular causal relations which it consists in -
here the description includes how the mechanism does it. A function is then multiply realizable
when there are at least two dierent 'kinds' of systems from which it is possible to extract this
function. The term kind here is more intuitive than properly dened. It seems that H.Putnam
chose the second type of functional description: "As Putnam denes this concept, 'Two systems
are functionally isomorphic if there is a correspondence between the states of one and the states of
the other that preserves functional relations'". The problem of the resulting notion of multiple
realizability is that the equivalence between two systems is trivial: they can dier only by
inessential (non causal) aspects of experience. In this case multiple realizability is philosophically
non-informative. However it is possible to rectify the notion by considering the weaker version of
functional description and that dierent kinds of realizations consist in dierent types of causal
structures (they dier by the strong version of functional description). Although the notion of
type here is not well dened, I consider that it is conceivable to nd a precise denition. This
way the possibility of non trivial multiple realizability is immediately veriable, but this leaves
open the problem of the possibility of multiple realizability for a collection of functions, and the
philosophical conclusions are a bit weak for talking about the relation between the mind and
the brain, but for my purpose it is enough to say that this kind of multiple realizability is in
principle possible and this makes the thesis of identity between mental states and brain states as
weak, and this leaves open the possibility to think about the relation between mind and brain
otherwise.
II.6.3  Another approximation problem: the τέλος
I would like, before going further, to insist on the multiplicity of approximation problems
which prevent from talking positively about the mind through its principled identity - in the
sense of H.Putnam - with the conceptualisation (in particular causal structure) of behavior. One
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other example of approximation problem is the one of the τέλος. For instance the function of
an eye is to see, but the τέλος consists in the particular use of the eye, in other words what it
is made for, which aects in particular the way it is connected to the remainder of the brain,
positioned relatively to it, as well as the particular way it executes its function - in particular
from points of view where the functional description does not exhaust the behavior of the system
in question.
This is another point where the approximation process applied to behavior instead of men-
tal mechanics via introspection fails to be informative about the mental, and where the argu-
mentation of H.Putnam becomes fragile in a subtle way, for instance in his article Minds and
machines [P60]. I use the term subtle for the reason that, in contradiction with what is usually
thought, H.Putnam does not adhere to the thesis that machines can think or that human beings
are machines - here in the sense that they can be constructed - as he explicitely states it in the
end of the introduction of this article. In the text the main use of computing machines is to
construct an analogy between the problem of the relation between mental states and physical
states and the problem of the relation between logical states (the ones that are written in the
machine table) and structural states (the physical states of a computing machine as physically
realized) of a computing machine. With various instances of this analogy, he proves that it is
possible for mental states and physical states to be dierent absolutely but identical in the sense
described above in Section II.6.1. With all this I agree but the problem lies in the philosoph-
ical conclusions oered in the Conclusion: H.Putnam conates the mind-body problem, which I
believe is the problem of how the mental and the physical are related, to the problem of how
is it possible that the mental and the physical can be identied ? While the series of analogies
used in his article to show that the later is a purely verbal problem, they do not tell us anything
about the mind-body problem. The reason is that while machines can realize functions related
to the states it is in (wether logical or structural), like ascertaining that it is in a certain state,
the machine never does it in the particular way a human being would execute it - for the actual
realization of the function is shaped by the τέλος, approximated in the analogy.
Accepting these analogies, for H.Putnam, we should (a) accept that conclusions about the
mind-body problem could not lead to shed any light on other problems "of more than purely
conceptual interest" (like the question of wether or not human beings have 'souls'); (b) nd
a description of the mind as a machine; (c) accept that human beings as well as computing
machines have souls. H.Putnam leaves the reader decide which alternative he or she wants to
adopt, but clearly tends to choose the conclusion (a) and assumes that the reader who would
not like to fall into absurd statements would agree with this conclusion. However it is derived
from analogies which do not hold because of the approximation problem.
I thus leave open for myself the possibility that some progression on the mind-body problem
can shed light on the nature of human 'soul' - what I may call the experiencing subject - and its
structure. For this one has to accept not to force oneself to hold to a correspondance between
mental content and (functional account of) behavior in order to inform about the mental, and
allow the use of (creative) introspection.
II.7  Global neuronal workspace theory
The global neuronal workspace theory, supported by S.Dehaene J.-P.Changeux, is the attempt
of understanding the mind which I think is the closest to the approach I am drawing in the present
text. However I believe that it is theoretically limited to experimental conrmation and precision
of existing insights - about the spatiality and organisation of the mind - by the unacceptance of
introspection as a method of study in a similar way as the approach of H.Putnam. I would like
to argue for this in this section.
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II.7.1  Intuitive roots of the theory
I believe that the central idea of the theory is to nd in the structure of the brain the
structure of the mind drawn originally by B.Baars in his Global workspace theory. The rooting
idea of B.Baars is that the human mind can be divided into two cognitive 'places', one in which
the subject can hold and transform a certain limited amount of information available globally,
meaning along any of the possible cognitive actions (for instance moving an arm or focusing on
a part of the visual space to collect an information in it and make it accessible globally) that
the subject can enter into in the second one (which consists in the collection of the places which
correspond to the cognitive actions), accessing complementarily to other information accessible
only locally - in the analogy with a theater, the rst place is the center, the scene, and the
second one is the audience. Furthermore the rst place is seen as central and the second as
peripheral, and they thus consist in a spatialisation of the mind - conceptualizing the mental
space as called for by J.Kim. Although it is a simplication of the structure of the mind, I
take it as a rather convincing rst approximation. The idea of S.Dehaene has been to build
a correspondance between this division of the mind into two cognitive places and a division of
the brain into two neuronal structures, and attempt to make more precise the cognitive trac
between the two cognitive places with the insight gained by the observation of exchanges of
information between the two neuronal structures in question, as well as other intuitions gained
by others with introspection. In particular in the rst place cognitive operations - such as some
the steps of a mathematical computation - are executed serially and consciously and in the second
one they are executed massively in parralel and unconsciously - for instance the construction of
a conceptualisation of the visual experience. I think also that the idea of D.Kahneman that the
mind (as well as the brain) is divided into two coherent sets of processes, respectively working
slowly and fastly in a complementary way - in order to reach an optimal trade-o between
precision and rapidity - supports this vision.
The theory of S.Dehaene and J.-P.Changeux conceptualizes the division of the brain into two
parts by associating particular types of mechanisms corresponding to the intuition: discrete (or
digital) information processing for the center and analog and distributed information processing
for the periphery; Turing's computing machines (with bounded memory) for the center and a
collection of local processors for the periphery. In the theory, the local processors corresponds to
part of the brain that have been attributed with a particular function (for instance processing
specic senses information). Furthermore the central machine 'recruits', 'connect ' and 'organise
together ' the local processors, through a trac of information through which some information
available globally is transmitted to the local processors (their inputs) and some information
held by them is made available globally (outputs) via a competition amongst many possible
signals. The spatiality of the structure reects the spatiality of division into two places of the
mind, and each of the parts of the brain in question are considered to be neuronal networks
(although in principle this could be adapted to more complex networks including glial cells for
instance). The central network is called in the theory global neuronal network and gives its
name to the theory. Another central correspondance is made also between the fact that a certain
information becomes accessible consciously to the mind with the phenomenon of 'ignition' of
the global neuronal network, meaning that the access of the information to the conscious mind
coincides with a global ring of this network. They also reiterated the idea of complementarity
as a statement on the complementarity between two modes of information processing by neural
mechanisms.
II.7.2  Some inexion in the introspective strategy
Despite the fact that the theory relies massively on intuitions gained via introspection,
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S.Dehaene seems to contort himself, in The brain mechanisms of conscious access and introspec-
tion [D13], with respect to how introspection should be used in the theorisation of consciousness.
Not as a method, against philosophers and the 'ill-dened concepts' that they posit in order
to conceptualise consciousness as such [for instance 'pheomenal awareness', or 'what it is like']
(probably because as a scientist he underestimates the diculty of the problem), because there
are cases (of illusion) when the result of (straightforward) introspection does not correspond to
the reality, but as an object (defending this use against residues of past behaviorism), because
there are some cases of introspection which can be properly delineated, encountered similarly
across subjects and thus studied experimentally, in particular when the subject has to report the
presence of a simple stimulus (conscious access). Since what is reported via introspection does
participate to the concept of consciousness, it should be possible to say something about this
phenomenon via the experimental method.
This approach is reasonable, but as soon as this progress is made towards the conceptual-
isation of the object of study, reductionism gets over again. This abandon of the domain of
experience happens in a dierent way than for integrated information theory though: here its
reason is not the projection in an expected formal context but the restriction of the experiences
considered to a thin subset of the possible ones. At a deeper level though, the 'understanding '
of consciousness that S.Dehaene claims often consists in unveiling brain mechanisms related to
consciousness, but not in answering questions related to consciousness itself, such as how pre-
cisely these mechanisms are related mechanically to phenomenal experience ? For instance the
following sentence ([D13],p. 4) is deceiving:
"We understand increasingly well how self-consciousness arises from a combination of brain
circuits specializing in the representation of dierent aspects of our selves (sensory maps of the
body, vestibular signals of head stability, programming of intentional movements, etc) (see e.g.
Lenggenhager, Tadi, Metzinger, Blanke, 2007).".
In fact by the identication of the mechanisms in question and their correlation with conscious
processes, one may only have an information on what in the brain may be involved in these
conscious processes, but not how these mechanisms are related to these conscious processes, let
alone understanding this hypothetical connection. This kind of identication and correlation
is what a strict experimental method restricts itself to by the rejection of introspection as a
method - it is sucient for the practical goal of the theory to provide a hint for the presence of
an experiencing subject, but not for understanding it.
In the case of conscious access, the mechanism in question is the ignition of the global neuronal
workspace and the global availability of information that is made possible by ignition "is what
we subjectively experience as a conscious state" (p.11). This identity, although it is attractive,
may be the very result of the restricted context of the experimental study: in general - when
considering any possible experience - the situation may be completely dierent. In particular the
phenomenon of ignition may simply be a causal intermediate which happens to be forced in the
restricted context. I think in fact that the global availability in the brain of an information could
at most be identied to global availability in the mind of this information, which is dierent,
until otherwise proved, from the mental state which corresponds to the information.
Furthermore if it is possible to accept this kind of identity, it is not necessarily the case that
every aspect of conscious experience is 'identical' to a physical counterpart. Holding the idea
that mental states may lie in additional dimensions, I think that activity in these dimensions
occurs only when necessary (a sort of optimisation principle). The approach that I like reects
this principle in the sense that I have recourse to both identication between mental and physical
and to additional dimensions only when possible and necessary.
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II.7.3  Towards a better understanding of the structure
Beyond the formulation of the identity between global availability of an information and the
conscious mental state corresponding to this information, the theory accounts for other aspects
of conscious access than the simple presence of the mental state to the mind:
"The GNW theory accounts for at least three aspects of subjective experience: (1) individuality:
the same stimulus may or may not lead to conscious ignition, and whether such ignition occurs,
in a given brain, is a stochastic event unique to each individual; (2) durability: thanks to its
reverberating self-connectivity, the GNW network can maintain information in mind for an
arbitrary duration, long after the actual sensory stimulation has vanished; (3) autonomy: the
shaping of spontaneous activity by GNW circuits leads to the stochastic endogenous generation
of a series of activation patterns, potentially accounted for the never-ending stream of
consciousness."
Other accounts of this type appear in other texts [for instance, dierences between minds and
machines, such as the dierence in eectiveness in executing simple arithmetic operations or face
recognition], however they most of the time consist in a simple reformulation, based on vocabulary
of the theory, of a description which results from introspection around a conscious access event.
Moreover: none of them concern aspects which are not straightforwardly connected to conscious
access; all of them consist in pointing at the possibility to realize on the model aspects which are
analogical to ones of the mind rather than constraining how these realizations should be done to
be coherent altogether.
For instance it would be interesting to answer the following questions: (i) does the phe-
nomenon of ignition concern only simple informations or also more complex ones ? which leads
to the question (ii) should the ignition phenomenon be considered to correspond the propagation
of an information through the whole global neuronal workspace, or as a warming of the neurons
of this workspace in preparation for wiring this information from one local module to another
(allowing a controled information integration) ? (iii) In both cases, what binds the quantity
of information which is transmitted through the workspace ? this kind of considerations can
provide a hint for the question (iv) how is an information retained by the workspace ?
In order to understand better the architecture drawn by the global neuronal workspace theory
and its relation to the structure of the mind, I think it would be more signicant to account,
for instance, for how fundamental transcendental operations (such as the ones of integrated
information theory) could be coincide (partially) with physical processes. In order to do so, one
should reverse the approach in the same way as integrated information theory does: going from
introspection and the description of experience to physics. Here this means describing experience
in terms of elementary concepts and then making hypotheses on how this description can be seen
or complement the model of brain already formed. Some of the aspects of experience that the
theory does not take into account are for instance: (i) the location of the point of view (the I ),
and the self-attribution of its decisions: taking mental computing machines as a fundamental
mode of the experiencing subject, how does it eectively decide if an action results from itself of
a local module ? (ii) if the global neuronal workspace is used to interconnect local modules in
order to instanciate locally in time a particular algorithm, how does the experiencing subject (or
the machine) 'knows' if this eort is necessary ? In other words how does it know if the algorithm
in question is not already 'encoded ' in the brain ? (iii) how does it recognizes local modules when
connecting them ? In other words what kind of 'adressing system' makes this recognition possible
? (iv) How does the experiencing subject makes present to itself an object it holds memory of
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? This object can be a number or a section of the visual space for instance. Does this presence
mean that this information is held by the local memory of the global neuronal workspace ? In
what sense ? Does the corresponding mechanism and the notion itself of 'presence' diers from
a type of objects to another ?
Before going further..
For the last question, we can observe in the practice of mathematics that drawings and
notations are used to make present abstract objects to the mind. This operation has an eect
on the possibility for the experiencing subject to conceptualise this objects and connect this
conceptualisation to other objects in memory. In particular the visualisation of these objects
make this more ecient (and easier). How is that so ? The practice of mathematics oers
several more questions of this kind which may be used as constraints on the model: this leads
us to phenomenology of mathematics.
Along this part I have dened an introspective approach of the structure of the experiencing
subject, delimited its purpose and the way it operates to create meaning, more negatively (deter-
mining it by what it is not) than positively. The arguments used may lead to the thought that
a science of consciousness is, despite recent development, not possible. However I do think that
it is not the case: only its cultural weight, which do not participate to its essence, is responsible
for the diculties encountered. After these negative arguments I wish to provide more positive
ones, taking examples of possibles directions for this approach to be applied.
We have seen from this part that we should shift from a theorisation of the mind as a machine
to a mechanistical one. This change in the nature of theorisation signies a change of purpose:
from reproducing the mind (and in particular consciousness), a purpose which derives from the
faith in articial intelligence, to the possibility to recognize and act upon the mind. This can be
made possible by condensating our designations of the mind used in the daily reality into statical
ones.
III.  How may the human brain simulate mental
computing machines?
This part is devoted to the following question: when simulating mentally a computing ma-
chine, what may correspond in the brain to the various elements in the denition of the machine
- for instance the tape, the head, and its movement - in the brain ?
III.1  Jacques Hadamard
In order to dene positively the way I will use introspection for this question, I will take
as reference the book The psychology of invention in the mathematical eld [H45] by Jacques
Hadamard.
III.1.1  Criticism of H.Poincaré's psychology of mathematics - variations and
constancy of the mathematician mind
I believe that the main point of the book is to oer a criticism of H.Poincaré's psychology of
mathematics. In particular he criticizes the idea of H.Poincaré that the way a mathematician
creates meaning is determined by the way this mathematician thinks [for him, as an analyst or
a logician], and in particular independant from the mathematical objects considered:
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"The method is not imposed by the matter treated. Though one often says of the rst that they
are analysts and calls the others geometers, that does not prevent the one sort from remaining
analysts even when they work at geometry, while the others are still geometers even when they
occupy themselves with pure analysis. It is the very nature of their mind which makes them
logicians or intuitionalists, and they cannot lay it aside when they approach a new subject." -
H.Poincaré.
J.Hadamard opposes and explores the idea that mathematicians dier in the way they tend
to use their mind in to create meaning rather than in the 'form' of their mind. Some rely more
on the unconscious part of their mind [intuition], while others do rely more on the conscious part
[logics]. They are all situated in a spectrum in between these two polar behaviors, according to
the depth the reection is immersed in the unconscious part of the mind, and how connected their
ideas and interests appear connected to others [dispersed for a more intuitive mind, concentrated
for a more logical one].
In fact I think that paradigm shifts such as the one which happend during the XIXth century
from constructive mathematics and conceptual ones also illustrate that the way mathematicians
use their mind does not follow strictly intemporal pathways.
Digression: I already mentioned the celebrated reection of H.Poincaré of how the 'illumi-
nation' phenomenon through which the solution of a problem appears all of a sudden after a long
unconscious processing after ingesting the data of the problem and failed attempts to solve it.
For this also there is some criticism to be made: in some particular elds where mathematics
are involved (I am thinking of statistical physics as I know it), the solution of a problem may
happen to appear after a long process combining various techniques without this apparition being
all sudden and clear.
As J.Hadamard puts it, the way a solution to a problem is constructed consists in the position
of many gatherings and display of mathematical objects and each time testing the adequation of
this construction as a solution to the problem:
"Indeed, it is obvious that invention or discovery, be it in mathematics or anywhere else, takes
place by combining ideas. Now, there is an extremely great number of such combinations, most
of which are devoid of interest, while, on the contrary, very few of them can be fruitful. Which
ones does our mind - I mean our conscious mind - perceive?" - J.Hadamard.
These combinations are mostly produced randomly (it makes sense to the observation that
this processing can happen during sleep), and concern objects which are posited by relations
made between objects which appear in the conceptualisation of the cognitive situation which
is opened by the reection on the problem with abstract objects which are not situated. Most
of these operations - conceptualisation, extraction and connection between objects and their
combination - happen mostly unconsciously. In fact it may be interesting to make hypotheses on
how the brain may mecanically execute these operations sequencially (in particular in which order
does it make the various possible combinations ?) When considering anew after this unconscious
processing the cognitive situation, if a solution has been found it appears for it has been selected
and stabilised unconsciously amongst other possible constructions.
Mathematician minds dier in the distribution of degree of consciousness for these operations
and these variations root the spectrum mentioned above, however surely not in the kind of
transcendental operations through which they create meaning. I believe that it is important
to understand - and I have begun in my last article with a partial classication - the set of all
possible ways for this meaning creation, through these operation, in order to keep alive all these
possible ways.
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III.1.2  An example of phenomenological description for mental imagery
Besides these considerations, J.Hadamard strives to dierenciate the practice of mathematics
itself from the mathematical script. Quoting Schopenhaur - "Thoughts die the moment they are
embodied by words." -, he argues that when thinking, words are absent, and thus are not necessary
to thoughts. I only partially agree with this for it depends on the way we think about words:
thoughts die when they are embodied by words because we think about words as embodiement
of thoughts instead of a way to communicate a direction of thoughts. However I believe that the
purpose of J.Hadamard here is to point at the fact that mathematical words do not capture the
reality of the mind of the mathematician, in particular they do not convey the mental imagery
used by the mathematician in order to have an insight into the machinery of the concepts that
are manipulated - in other words what is present to the mind in the moment of reasoning.
In order to illustrate what he refers to, he proposed a phenomenal description of what he has
in mind consciously when proving that there is a prime greater than 11, describing the mental
images that he holds at each step of the proof. This description is as follows:
STEPS IN THE PROOF MY MENTAL PICTURES
1. I consider all primes from 2 to 11,
say 2, 3, 5, 7, 11.
1. I see a confused mass.
2. I form their product N being a
rather large 2 ∗ 3 ∗ 5 ∗ 7 ∗ 11 = N .
2. N being a rather large number, I
imagine a Point rather remote from the
confused mass.
3. I increase that product by 1, say N
plus 1.
3. I see a second point a little beyond
the rst.
4. That number, if not a prime, must
admit of a prime divisor, which is the
required number.
4. I see a place somewhere between the
confused mass and the rst point.
I mention this here for it provides an example of possible phenomenological description - and
thus a direction for introspection - of mental imagery from which we may infer on the structure of
the experiencing subject. We may notice that at each step of the phenomenological description
diers from its counterpart in the proof by its simplicity, since the objects of this description
are only visual ones displayed on a 'mental board '. In particular the 'confused mass' and the
points do not contain any arithmetic information that numbers hold as mental objects. I think
that during the mental process which underlies the proof, what appears to the mind reects the
creation of connections between spots on the mental board and local processors (the same ones
as in global neuronal workspace theory) which hold this kind of arithmetic information, thus
organizing the communication between these local processors through the mental board. Once
the connections are created, this communication happens mainly at the unconscious level. In
order to rene this description, one may ask further questions such as where is the mental board
and how connections are realized.
While purely subjective, mental imagery does not seem to be dependant upon the particular
subject - this should be clear for mathematicians and, according to J.Hadamard, for some intel-
lectual from other elds who use similar mental imagery for their reasoning. Descriptions such as
the one above, if properly executed intersubjectively, and when compared to the model of mental
space structure, shoudl thus tell us something about the structure of experiencing subject, and
not be specic of any particular subject. Such a description may be done on other mathematical
reasonings or other aspects of mathematical practice, and as well simple daily cognitive events.
For instance what appears to the mind while searching for a memory which I know I have but is
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lost ? (this provides an interesting example of simple dynamics between unconscious mind and
conscious one, for it consists in a partially conscious process directed towards the unconscious
mind so that something appears to the conscious mind). However when focusing on mathe-
matical practice, phenomenological descriptions obtained out of it should be more likely to be
interrelated. Based on this interrelation we may lead abstract queries such as: what kind of
mental images can I hold in my mind (characterization) ?
As I mentioned earlier, I would like to focus on computing machines because they form a
fundamental mode of the experiencing subject. What I would like to do is introspecting in a
similar way as J.Hadamard on: what appears to the mind when simulating a computing machine
? Furthermore what is the cognitive process by which I arrive at the conclusion that I may
simulate the computations of any computing machine ?
III.2  What can be hoped for - meaning creation
Before answering these questions, I will use one more section to explain the epistemological
status of the elements obtained by the kind of reasoning operated here, in particular how they
should be considered and articulated, as well as what may be expected from these operations.
All this shall be explained by the properties of what I call 'iconic introspective capacity '.
III.2.1  Iconic introspective capacity
In 1960, G.Sperling investigated [S60] visual short term memory in experiments during which
subjects were presented with a brief visual stimulus which consisted in an array of alphanumeric
characters. After the stimulus disappeared they were requested: (i) to report as many characters
from the stimulus and their position in the array; (ii) or to report as many characters in a
particular row of this array (this row was not known before the experiment and this information
was transmitted at to the subject under the form of an auditory stimulus). The experiments
demonstrated that the capacity to report was signicantly increased from the rst case to the
second one. G.Sperling coined the term 'iconic memory ' in order to designate the memory
of visual displays. I believe that the dierence in terms of capacity of iconic memory when
focusing on a restricted area of a visual display may be explained in the following way: rst,
the information contained in the stimulus is held only for a certain period of time after which
it is lost; second, the action of reporting requires a choice of order to follow on the positions of
symbols to be reported, and the larger the area of focus, the longer the period of time required
for choosing; third, the longer the time required for choosing, the less accessible the information
is.
I think that this paradigm can be applied to the capacity for introspection, which can be
thought to consist in the report to oneself of elements in spatial displays, where the geometry of
the space varies from one area of cognition to another. In particular the capacity to introspect
in one area is dependant upon how wide it is. In terms of [G20], statical designations and
dynamical ones represent two complementary moment of the language which describes the world:
the second ones, when composed, delineate areas of cognition in which introspection can act in
order to constitute statical designations which may be selected and composed and altogether
structured in order to understand these same areas. Furthermore the notion of micro-world
statically designate examples of this notion of area of cognition.
III.2.2  How to apply this paradigm ?
Practically, however, how should this paradigm be applied to introspection without an un-
derstanding of the spatiality of the mind ? One way is introspect while holding a certain object
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in mind, wether it is a singular information, a concept or a question - for instance, how does
the adressing system of my conscious mind works ? This objects works then as a selector which
restricts the subarea I am considering without actually characterizing it in the area I am intro-
specting in.
In particular, this is one purpose of focusing on a fundamental mode of the experiencing
subject in order to understand its general form and dynamics, as well as focusing on the layer
of causal relations between mental events rather than the phenomenal content of these events.
Furtheremore some concepts such as free will - in particular facts related to these concepts
such as judgements - may locally play a similar role, under the form of questions such as what
information is accessible to 'me', at which point, how dicult is its access, how much do 'I'
contribute causally to an event, how do I decide to attribute to myself the cause of an event ?
etc. I will discuss these in later sections.
When considering mental computing machines and their simulation, I can hold as a question
the form and localisation of the machine head, as well as by which mechanisms it reads writes
and move. Is it moving or xed (I think that it is actually partially xed, partially moving)
? Furthermore how do 'I' have access to informations about the computing process ? Can an
answer to this question explain why I have access to some information and not to another ?
Although they are of dierent nature, I would like to mention that other constraints coming
from our intuition on space, time, and how these constrain information ow - for instance that
there can not be an innite amount of information in an 'element ' of space and time, as well as
the partial knowledge of the brain architecture. This kind of constraints may be used to select
between alternative hypotheses.
The elements of a conceptualisation out of introspection may be used further to increase
introspective capacity; any time it is possible it should be assumed, at least temporarily, that
these elements have a material counterpart and consider how this counterpart may be related -
both spatially and functionally - to the elements of the model already formed.
As well the use of introspection could make reexive and one could attempt introspectively
to explain the properties of iconic introspective capacity itself.
III.2.3  Conceptual creation and mathematics of the experiencing subject
I believe that most barriers on introspection are related to this notion of iconic introspective
capacity, including the dynamical nature of the experiencial content of a considered area of
cognition. In point of fact I have believed for a long time that the nature of the experiencial
content determines the possibility of a reliable conceptualisation. Thinking this way implies that
the creation of concepts may only come with an increase of complexity. On the other hand the
examples of A.Turing's computing machines, the general denition of dynamical systems or even
J.Nash's game theory made me wonder: how come that these 'simple' mathematical objects were
not dened before ? With time I came to the conclusion that an meaningly eective mathematical
concept is not contained in its denition. Regardless of the complexity of its denition, its
experiencial roots, which lie in between the intelligible and the sensible, are determining the
questions with which mathematicians inquire it and ultimately understand it. A signicant
concept - such as, I believe, the one of causal structure - is so for the depth of these roots. I
think that similar concepts may come out of a clear picture about the structure of the relation
between the mental and the physical in the case of mental computing machines.
Simple but signicant concepts may be drowned under the sea of all possible concepts until
they are dened. As J.Hadamard puts it:
"Invention is discernment, choice." - J.Hadamard.
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III.3  On the simulation of mental computing machines
In this short section, I will dwelve into the main subject of this part: the simulation of
mental computing machines. Its purpose is only to provide evidence for the possibility of further
developments in the same direction.
Let me remind that a computing machine, as dened by A.Turing, consists in an innite tape
written with symbols in a nite set of possible ones, on which a machine head can move, read
and overwrite symbols. The machine head can be only in nitely many possible states and a
nite table describes the dynamical behavior of this head, determining its movement and what
it writes according to its current states and the information on the tape it has access to (which
is written on the tape at its position).
As I mentioned above, this concept was formed to describe the mathematician's mind in the
process of computing. In fact once properly dened, this structure may be recognized in many
other mental processes. Furthermore it is relatively intuitive that the human mind may simulate
any computing machine. The question I would like to address here is the following: how to
describe what is happening in the mind when I make a judgement about a statement of this kind
? It is quite clear that what is happening comprises the (abstract) computing process itself but
as well can not be reduced to this computing process. In particular, what may correspond to the
elements of the denition - tape, machine head - in the brain ? Are there 'auxiliary ' processes
which are necessary to the simulation ?
I present my observations in a table similar to the one of J.Hadamard, where the proof is
replaced with the mental simulation of computing machines, and mental pictures with mental
processes which underly each step of this simulation: see Table 1, Table 2 and Table 3. I also
assume that the machines are initialized with empty tape.
STEPS IN THE SIMULATION (TRACE OF) MENTAL PRO-
CESSES
1. I display the table which is meant
to contain the machine rules.
1. I choose a random place of my
'mental board'; I mentally instanciate
a table at this place; only one or two
cases appear to my mind with the algo-
rithm of repeating this display accord-
ing to the quantity of information it
will contain;
2. I display information relative to the
rules in the table.
2. I determine the number of rows of
the table (5) ; I connect each row of
the table with the idea of a type of in-
formation that it will contain: current
state, current tape symbol, new state,
new tape symbol, movement direction
Table 1: Phenomenological description, part i.
This is a description of 'what happens' in my mind when I imagine simulating a computing
machine, whatever are its rules and symbols. Based on these mental constructions I can con-
dently say that I can simulate any computing machine - I only need material and symbolic
inputs. Now let us try to see how each of the operations involved in this process may coincide
with physical processes in the brain.
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STEPS IN THE SIMULATION (TRACE OF) MENTAL PRO-
CESSES
3. I determine how to use the table. 3. for the remainder of the simula-
tion, I hold the information that at the
beginning of the computing process, I
will receive information (for instance
from another person) of the machine
rules and write them down in the table
(one column, one rule); I split the rows
into two sets (inputs,outputs); during
the computing process, each time I ac-
cess the table, I access it with two in-
formations which determine a column
to look into, these two information cor-
responding to the inputs; while looking
into the column, I drop these informa-
tion from my memory and collect the
information contained in the last three
rows of this column, before leaving the
table.
4. I display the tape and the machine
head.
4. As for the table, I choose another
random place of the mental board far
enough from the table (so that they do
not overlap: this simplies informa-
tion processing); I mentally instanci-
ate a tape at this place, meaning a ta-
ble with only one row (of undenite
length), hold the information that the
machine head will be on the leftmost
position at the beginning of the process
in a particular state. I picture that in
general the machine can be on any po-
sition (I see one point on a line) in any
state (I see another point on the top of
the rst one).
Table 2: Phenomenological description, part ii.
Let us begin with the instanciation of the table and the tape. I think it is reasonable to think
that the mental board that supports them coincides with neural maps of grid cells networks,
and that the instanciation of these objects consists physically into 'warming up' areas of these
networks by simply 'visiting' them. I think that it is also reasonable to think that the information
of the algorithms allowing the construction of these objects - when actually executing the process
- is not 'contained' in this network but in another specic area of the brain and that they are
hard-encoded into neural structures. I see two reasons for that: rst, I imagine it would be
a dicult process to script the algorithm from scratch and this diculty does not match the
rapidity with which I instanciate objects in space; second, it is likely that I use this kind of
elementary algorithms for many other situations in which I am not necessarily conscious that
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STEPS IN THE SIMULATION (TRACE OF) MENTAL PRO-
CESSES
5. I determine how to use the tape. 5. When entering the area of the tape
holding a certain information from the
board, I use the rst one to overwrite
on the letter, the second to change the
state of the machine head (I imagine
respectively the act of erasing the con-
tent of the points and then droping
the the information I am holding), and
the third to move the machine head to
a neighbor position (I imagine eras-
ing the two points and moving both
points to the left, erasing them and
writing them back to the previous posi-
tion, then erasing them again and writ-
ing them on the position on the right),
before leaving the area.
6. I determine the visit order of the
table and the tape.
6. I hold the information that I will
begin the process in the area of the tape;
I also picture a movement of back and
forth between the tape and the table.
Table 3: Phenomenological description, part iii.
I use them, and it is simpler to script them in a dedicated area of the brain and 'call' them
whenever needed. When I instanciate these objects (the table and the tape), I imagine that I
create (locally in time) a connection between the location of the algorithms and the areas of
the network. Here again I think it would be dicult to make a 'direct' connection, meaning
connecting specically the algorithm with the area: if the connection was not there, my brain
would need to create a neural path that it would need to destruct imediately after; if it was there,
there would be no reason for the many other potential connections of this type to be already there
in the brain, however there would be a problem with the niteness of information present in an
element of space and time : how could all these neurons be present in the brain at the same time
? I think on the other hand that it is reasonable to believe in a hierarchy of hard-wired access
connection from the global neuronal workspace to the many areas of the brain. The connection
between the algorithm and the area of the grid-cells networks may be thus created by sending
a signal from the global neuronal worskpace to the area of the brain containing the algorithm,
back the the global neuronal workspace where the signal is directed to the area of the grid-cells
networks which has been warded up at the same time, creating a path between the two - this
path may be maintained all along the computation process, simply by continuously sending a
similar signal, which is then directed only by its own trace.
Since the apprehension of 'I' does not depend on time during this process, in particular the
fact that I am constantly able to designate 'I' as the cause of each sub-process, this indicates
that the place which may be the support of apprehension processes is also constant, somewhere
in the global neuronal workspace. When I say that I visit a certain area of the mental board, or
the area containing a certain algorithm, I am present in this area, but I also still am where 'I'
is. One way to see that this is possible would be to say that I consits in a signal continuously
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sent from the place of 'I' to the cognitive place that I am considering, with immediate return to
the place of 'I'. For instance I have hypothesized above that when I am creating a connection
between an algorithm and a place, I am visiting these two places: this means that there is a
signal sent from the place of 'I' to this place and immediately in return to the place of 'I', and
the direction to which this signal is directed is continuously informed by information held in the
place of 'I'. How is this signal directed ? Regarding specic algorithms, it is possible that the
information of the adress of this algorithm is simply encompassed in the concept of computing
machine as it is learnt (and then in the concept of table or tape, etc), this address being passed
continuously when direction is needed to the place of 'I' in order to inform the signal's direction.
When the adress is only partially dened, such as 'a place on the mental board' the direction of
the signal is feeded only with the adress corresponding to the board itself, and then not feeded
anymore with information, which renders the place in the board random.
Let me just remark at this point that the signal sent from the place of 'I' to the place visited
at a certain time and back to the place of 'I' together with this place of I may be seen as the head
of a machine working on a tape which has a more complex geometry than the unidimensional
tape of the denition of computing machines. Furthermore the distinction between the tape and
the machine head in this case is less clear.
We can consider then what happens when I am visiting the area of the table. In particular
during this visit I collect some information. This means marking the sub-area where these
informations are contained and connecting this sub-area with a counter algorithm, each value of
the counter corresponding to a row of the table. In fact when I am moving from one area to the
other, I am not really holding in mind these precise informations, which indicates that I have
dropped them somewhere I will be able to gather them back when I will be elsewhere. Since
there is a local route (via the global neuronal workspace) from the area of the tape to the area
of the table, I only have to send a request to the information I need via this route, the address
of the information in the table area being contained in this area, and get back the information
at this address. Each time sending this request, the counter algorithm increments and sends an
ending signal when the counter has maximal value. A similar process is exectuted when I enter
the table with an information relative to the tape.
When moving from one area to the other, the 'I' signal only has to follow the route traced
between the two areas. In order to complete the picture I only need to account for what happens
when writing on the tape. When I have instanciated the program that I am following, I have
only connected the area with an algorithm including the action of modifying certain symbols
contained in the tape. However when actually executing the program materially (for instance
writing on a sheet of paper), it is not dicult to gure out by what means I will execute this part.
It is possible that the prefrontal cortex contains intrasensioral commands which are applicable
whatever the situation, and in particular here unconsciously, such as 'whenever I want to make
a modication in my visual eld, I have to use my hand '.
Some remarks: (i) Let me remark here that when preparing the simulation of a computing
machine, the actions of 'warming up' the various areas and the creation of local routes between
them may be done in a dierent order than the one I presented. However this should not change
what can be hypothesized about the relation between the mental and the physical. (ii) The
second remark I would like to make is that when preparing my mind to execute a program
like a computing machine, in the interpretation that I provide, 'I' mainly interconnect various
algorithmic modules through the global neuronal workspace. Furthermore the kind of information
that 'I' keep in mind across dierent tasks seem to be only the routes connecting the dierent
modules. The phrase 'I keep in mind that the in the table in column x and row y there is..' is a
language construction: I do not really keep this information in mind, I only keep a way to access
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it without eort. (iii) The above may be seen as a collection of observations which can serve to
sharpen introspection around this fundamental mode of the experiencing subject. In fact we may
recall the question wether the mind works as a computing machine or not. There are elements
to think that it is the case, but the above does not really provide an answer. However if we are
to think that it is not the case, further exploration may lead to exhibit mind mechanisms which
can not be described in terms of computing machines. (v) The approach that I present here
does not pretend to be coherent with the data we have on the human brain, however the main
point is not to provide evidence for a certain interpretation of data, but to make possible the
collection of 'data' on the mind.
III.4  Directions for further investigation
The purpose of the last section was only to sketch an introspective approach of the simulation
of mental computing machines by the human brain in practice. In the following I provide some
orientations for further investigation of this type. By reason of the nature of this investigation,
they take in general the form of constraints which may ultimately determine our concept of how
the mental computing machines - and ultimately mental machinery in general - are actually
simulated by the human brain, by removing possibilities that we may imagine (when they can
be formulated in terms of the model already constructed) and which enter in contradiction with
the constraints, or by tightening the meshes of introspection.
Because the focus here is on the general structure of the experiencing subject, constraints
may not be necessarily directly related to the concept of timeless experience and its fundamental
characteristics, or fundamental operations acting on the representation of an experience, such
as in Integrated information theory, but shall be concerned with experiencing, and thus the
dynamics of the relation between the subject and its Experience.
In this setting I see two types of constraints: (i) principled constraints on the form of the
experiencing subject; (ii) existence of particular modes of the experiencing subject and their
characteristics.
In general constraints of type (i) apply on the constructed representation of the structure
of the experiencing subject through an optimisation principle. Let us consider for instance the
phenomenon of information integration. We may study this concept statically by considering
particular experiences and wonder how to relate it to objectness. In the present context we
should consider it dynamically instead, and how information integration is modulated for a
certain purpose. If we query the question of why information integration happens or not while
keeping in mind that its modulation requires an eort, we should arrive at the idea that it is
optimised for the purpose, constraining the dynamics of the experiencing subject. In particular
the idea of a central area where certain information is shared between many parts of the brain
in a single time could in fact be derived from the optimisation principle, as it is less costly than
sharing this information through a collection of module-specic connections. This applies also
to the idea of a balance between permanent and temporary channels for sharing information. In
practice this kind of constraint may be applied on the current model by wondering if there could
be another system which is more optimal way regarding these constraints - such a system may
account unexpectedly for other aspects of experiencing. On the other hand, constraints of type
(ii) apply on the model of the experiencing subject by queries on the possibility to adapt it in
order to account for some characteristics of the modes of the experiencing subject in question.
In the following, I will list and sometimes discuss some examples of such constraints.
III.4.1  Specic modes of the experiencing subject
I have mentioned at the beginning of this section the functioning of the mathematician's
mind as a particular mode of the experiencing subject. Some works, in particular by S.Dehaene
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(see for instance the presentation 'A close look at the mathematician's brain? ' [S17], or the arti-
cle [SA16]), attempts to localize in the brain areas underlying simple mathematical operations,
using experimental methods. I believe that in this direction the introspective method (that I
have attempted to dene above) may be applied on more complex operations and reasonings. I
suspect this would lead to more precise, although hypothetical, insights in how brain processes
may coincide with these operations and reasoning. However I have not developped signicantly
this direction yet, leaving it open to a potential reader (which may be the author).
However there are some questions that I nd interesting to query: (i) when searching for the
solution of a problem (or even more generally searching for a memory to remember), how does
the brain underly the mental process of selecting and rejecting ideas or mental items based on
the adequation to this search ? (ii) I have observed during my own training that the 'world'
(dened as a local set of possible experiences) in which the subject evolves aects the capacity
to conceptualize a particular experience and memorize and operate on this conceptualization.
Is there a systematic relation here and how could this be translated into brain mechanisms
? (iii) On the combinatorics of instanciations of mental algorithms. I have analysed above
the instanciation of a mental computing machine, which requires a certain mental eort: when
instanciating a second one after the rst, am I able to keep 'in memory ' the rst one to repeat it
after the second without the eort of re-instanciating it ? - if yes, how ? Similar question for the
modication of an algorithm after modication of its formal description (these questions may
be asked also for embodied mental processes). How do the answers to these questions change
with the number of algorithms ? Furthermore how to characterize the eort demanded by the
instanciation of a mental algorithm in its formal description ? (iv) why exactly makes it easier
to process information when it is supported by visual items than when it is not ? For instance
when I attempt to evaluate purely mentally some properties of triangles in general - let's say the
equality of the lengths of all edges implies the equality of all angles - I have to construct in my
mind the triangle point by point, and then construct a representation of the edges and angles,
and come back to these objects to stabilize their presence in my mind. In can thus say that this
construction is an obstacle for this mental reasoning compared to reasoning with visual support,
but it is not all. In fact we can also put it in the following way: how to characterize what
is purely mentally 'computable' ? (v) Some mental processes can be done in parallel: how to
characterize sets of mental processes which can be parellelized ? what explains can the possibility
of parallelization ? (vi) How to characterize properties of the mental space which determine the
variable diculty of the mental machine head (in other words the focus of my attention) to
navigate in this space ? (could this explain why bidimensional grid structures underly cognition
of space as we commonly conceive it ?). (vii) We may notice that when reasoning with visual
support, we tend to subdivide hierarchically this visual support in a way which depends on the
objects and operations done on these objects. Is there a way to explain or predict this subdivision
from the data of the objects and operations in terms of actual computational capacity derived
from the structure of the experiencing subject ? (viii) One may also analyse simple algorithms
found in mathematical practice everywhere, such as visual search for an item or a type of item:
what could they teach us about how mathematical objects may be 'stored ' in the brain ? For
instance when, in a picture which consists in a white canvas with black dots and a unique red dot,
I search for the position of the red dot. It is manifest that the search process is not accounted
for by an exhaustive search over the canvas through a restricted scope until the scope's content
matches the object searched for. In fact we could think in the following way: I can decompose
the mental search algorithm, without aecting the way it is related to physical processes, into
one step which consists in preparing the search algorithm to be executed without visual stimulus,
and then another executing it on the particular stimulus. Let us assume I was asked by another
person to execute this search: "nd the red dot in the picture and point at it with your nger".
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The preparation goes the following way: once parsed the sentence, I identify the imperative verb
and the action it requires me to do, which points to an object in the sentence. I extract then
the information relative to the object: its shape (dot) and its color (red). In order to do this,
I need to mentally repeat the sentence by sending a signal to the module related to autitory
stimuli while invoking a parsing algorithm and a semantic analysis on the sentence I heard, this
by creating a connection between the module and the specic algorithm. Once the words relative
to the objects are extracted from the sentence, I construct a mental representation of this object
that I will use for the search, by invoking the construction algorithm for a point (which roughly
consists in choosing randomly an area of the mental board and shrinking it until not possible
anymore) and connecting it to the 'entry ' of the mental board, together with the concept of color,
specied with the color red. Without contact with the visual experience, unconsciously (since
the dot appears to me without eort), the signal bearing the information of the color red should
be diused through all the mental board, in a hierarchical manner - I assume here that there
are along the grids hierarchical structures which encode positions on the mental board. The
signal is compared on each position by an elementary process which results in a binary answer
to the query. When positive, the answer is sent back to the entry of the board. In this case the
signal which is sent to this position and sent back is maintained continuously until the end of the
search process (this way adresses of the red dots on the board are encoded in these signals). These
signals in fact may be the material counterpart of the conceptualisation of the visual experience,
dependant upon a certain purpose - in other words they may coincide with mental objects. Once
this is set up, 'I' only need to send a signal to the visual board holding in mind the idea that
it will be directed in the board towards 'whatever has been detected ', following randomly one
of the the continuously maintained signals in the hierarchical structure over the board. This
description seems to account for properties of the mental search algorithm - in particular what
is manifested in my mind when directing my attention to a red dot already present to my mind.
More generally, what kind of characteristics make a mental object eortlessly searchable, and
how do they aect the search process ? (ix) Many situations in the practice of mathematical
reasoning involves a counter - in other words an encoding of time. In general, how should this
encoding be implemented in the brain to account for the mental algorithms involving a counter
? A bold extension of this question may be: how do instanciations of counters in the brain relate
to the general intuition of time ?
The mind in the process of practicing mathematics corresponds to one of the main modes
of the experiencing subject that I would like to consider. The second mode is the one of the
mind in the process of meditating. As a matter of fact, the study of meditation's eects on the
brain has attracted the attention of neuroscientists amongst which S.Lazar (see for instance the
article [L12] and the presentation [L12p]), who proved that meditation leads to increases of gray
matter density - in other words it has a material eect on the brain. I like to account for this fact
in the following way. Human minds have a tendency to 'forget ' certain beings in favor of others,
meaning that they neglect them systematically in the experience - in other words these beings are
in general absent from the conceptualisation of experience. The reason for this forgetfulness are
the tendency of focusing on particular beings as well as the limited attention capacity. Materially
this may correspond to the idea, widely present in the reasonings I propose, that neural activity
may often be the trace of a mental operation used as input for other operations; in general this
signies that 'I ' am attracted by parts of my mind which correspond to already active part of
the brain - which makes dicult to 'rediscover ' areas of my mind which have been inactive for
a long time. Basics of meditation consist in the focalization over a phenomenon independant
of any particular experience - such as the sensation of self or the mechanical act of breathing -
or at least in-signicant - such as the sensation of the ground in the feet. With this exercise,
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the activity state of the various other brain areas is rendered undierenciated, uniform - in
other words the mind is "open" or "free" because it is not naturally led to particular ideas
or mental reexes coming from an excessive focus. From this it is not dicult to see how to
derive the 'scientically validated ' positive eects of meditation, such as the reduction of tension,
depression, anxiety, insomnia, increase in attention capacity, etc (which are also translated into
growth and reduction of some brain areas [L12]). Since the activity of brain areas is rendered
undierenciated, beings which were forgotten may reappear: thus the association of mediation
with the idea of discernment of the inside world ickering richness - this is, I believe, the mental
stage which is represented in Alchemy by the colorful peacock.
The third mode of the experiencing subject I am interested in is the one of the mind when
acquiring reexes, habits. When for instance when learning how to manipulate a certain machine,
I have to instanciate each time the mental algorithm corresponding to 'how to use this machine'.
With time I do not have to make this eort - in other words I do not need to think about it
when using the machine - because I know how to use it. For me it is natural to think that while
learning each instanciation of the algorithm are done in a similar way as the one I described for
computing machines, when learning is over the algorithm is actually hard-wired in the brain -
this could explain why its execution is then done with more ease. The question is then: provided
this hypothesis, how can we account for the constitution and modulation of this (neural) circuitry
? - in particular without complete central control. I think that neural activity itself may be a
marker which mechanically attracts newly created neurons. Neurons assembled this way would
imitate an activity pattern and thus reproduce the corresponding algorithm in a hard-wired way.
I am guessing that without a sustained activity these neurons are misled and thus stay inactive
long enough to be dismantled, by the same mechanism which may modulate neural density when
inactive (probably under other conditions). For similar reason, connections created this way
should be close to each other - in terms of metrics, which may account for the possibility to make
connections between ideas only on the short range, in other words ideas which are thematically
close. The idea of a relation between (neural) activity and creation of new neuronal connections
may also explain the exibility of brain organization. For instance S.Dehaene [S17] mentions
measurements done on the brain of a blind mathematician who seems to recycle neurons of the
area 'dedicated' to vision for mathematics. I believe however that it is easier to think that
the neurons which occupy the same area in the blind mathematician and the non-blind one
derive from growth of neuronal structures out of dierent activity patterns - defect of visual
activity and mathematics as a replacement, respectively attention to visual stimuli and then
later mathematics - rather than 'specialized' neurons having to change their career. In a similar
way, this relation may explain how meditation modulates neural density.
Furthermore, I hold the idea that mathematical objects are present in the unconscious mind,
under one form or another, and that the practice of mathematics consists in reproducing them
in the conscious mind. Assuming this is the case, what mechanisms may explain how this
reproduction is possible ?
III.4.2  Perturbations of the experiencing subject's dynamics
Some perturbations may change important characteristics of the experiencing subject, which
is of interest in the study of its possible forms. I would like rst to speak here about some
experiences I had under marijuana some time ago, which I think may be interesting to analyse:
(i) I had an experience similar to out-of-body experience - meaning one during which the subject
perceives the world as if in a location outside of the body - in the sense that I felt as if my
experience was the 'movie' of someone else's experience, one second after this person actually
lived it. I think that it was still my experience, but somehow I was not able to attribute it to
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me. Does there exist a mechanism which integrates the experience as a whole and 'I' together
? In this case how to does the perturbation (marijuana) aects this mechanism ? (ii) Another
time, I had my various senses disintegrated: I could perceive objects in the world through each
of these senses - each of them individually was not aected - but I was not able to integrate
immediately objects of dierent senses that I usually consider to form an object together. For
instance I could touch a table, hear the sound that it makes when I hit it, or look at it, but the
'tactile table', the 'auditory table', and the 'visual table' were not the same. There might be a
disturbance of a mechanism creating connections between aspects of the same object: does this
disturbance happen in the global neuronal workspace or in hard-wired connection ?
I think that it is possible that I both points (i) and (ii) what roots these two types of
experiences is a perturbation of the sense of time and a general slowdown of activity. In fact
I had another experience (iii) in which I felt trapped into a temporal loop, of which I had the
sensation that it would never end.
Addiction consists in another form of disintegration of the self, because it bears with it
situations in which some decisions that are made by 'I' without 'I' willing to make them. How
to account for this disintegration ? It may be possible that multiple personalities disorders are
an extreme manifestation of only this multiplicity of 'I' which is inherent to every experiencing
subject. After all, 'Je est un autre' - said A.Rimbaud. In fact, how to we attribute decisions
and actions to ourselves ? I think that what is mysterious in multiple personalities disorders
is the nature of 'personality ' and what such a term may refer to in the brain. A look into the
previous question might teach us something about this.
Some perturbations on thought mechanisms may be caused partially from inside: for instance
emotions aect thoughts. How exactly do they ? One property to take into account is that wether
they are positive or negative, even if they are cause by specic thoughts, emotions have a global
eect on thinking which does not depend on the content of thoughts themselves. I think that
this property may provide a possible hypothesis on how this eect is realized: via a diusive
transmission of information rather than wired, thus outside of neural structures. Astrocytes
may support this transmission of information, and provide a way through which it aects neural
activity. On the other hand how to explain the conceptualization of emotions ? How can some
thoughts trigger systematically a specic emotion ?
I have observed that some emotions like wrath aect our judgements about causation: when
I am angry and searching for the cause of my pain or actually any mental event, I usually
tend to shorten causal chains or to consider only causal relations between 'macroscopic' objects
rather than 'microscopic' ones. This suggests overall a reduction of the capacity to make causal
judgements. It does not seem to be the case for all of them: how to characterize the emotions
which have this eect ? Furthermore how are causal relations encoded in the brain and how to
account in it for the relation between causal judgements and wrath ? In fact think that wrath
acts on attention before causal judgements, and the relation between the scope of attention and
causation is clear. These intuitions may serve as constraints on the way causal relations are
encoded in the brain.
In fact I have also noticed that emotions can change our conceptualisation of an experience:
for instance when I was in a half-conscious state while waking up, I tend to see objects in the
dark as human beings, whose positions are coherent with the form of the objects I perceive. I
believe that these half-conscious states reveal a fundamental conceptualization of experiences
over-ruled in conscious states which tend to priviledge animate objects over inanimate ones, for
the simple reason that animate objects are more likely to be dangerous.
We may also see dreams as perturbed dynamics of the experiencing subject. I think that
certain properties of dreams may relate to the integration information realized by the global
neuronal workspace structure. In particular it seems that the presence of certain objects or
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aspects in the dreams is correlated with the occurence of events during the last day and the
causal impact of these events and related objects and aspects. This suggests that this presence
should coincide with a residual (neuronal) activity. Furthermore this activity may be what
triggers connections between residually active areas in a chaotic way. The dierence between
dreams and reality would then be the action of a control on which connections are made. I think
some shamanic practices as well as some transcendental operations in phenomenology - such as
the ἐποχή - consist in countering an over-control of how these connections are made, and thus
bringing a part of dream to the reality in a sense, opening the mind to objects which are real
and present but unperceived because of this over-control. How do dreams and psychedelic states
dier in these terms ?
III.4.3  Free will
One important principled constraint on the form of the experiencing subject is free will. Of
course it seems possible to conceive a subject of experience without this free will, however it is
dicult to imagine such a subject entering into a relation with his or her experience without
it. G.Tononi proposed an account of free will based on his Integrated information theory in his
presentation [T21]. The baseline is the following:
1. What exists consists in "maxima of intrinsic irreducible cause-eect power, at the optimal
grain". Intrinsic, because considering causation from the subject's point of view: what
does exist for the subject ? The other properties specify causal properties which are meant
to describe what exists for the subject. By contrast, experience from an extrinsic point of
view is an experience in a world which consists in the collection of possible experiences of
subjects in the same situation. We may associate this point of view to an abstract subject
in whose point of view causal relations are absolute. Since this subject is not real, it does
not make sense to describe what exists for it. By convention, anything which has causal
power exists.
2. In this sense, I exist intrisically because of the causal power of 'I'. In other words I have
free will from my point of view because from this point of view I can be the cause of a
decision for instance between alternatives, but I do not have free will from the extrinsic
point of view because there 'I' (or an extrinsic equivalent which is caused and causes 'I') is
not the cause of this decision. Furthermore it is possible to exhibit this kind of change in
causal structure properties on formal dynamical systems.
I shall agree with the second point, except on the following point: can the object 'I' from
the intrinsic point of view be really identied with the 'I' from the extrinsic point of view ?
Furthermore if we identify them in Putnam's sense, how can we exhibit this identication ? From
what point of view the causes should be evaluated for this ? In fact, without denition what 'I'
is, this second point shall be reduced to making sense of how free will may be compatible with
extrinsic determinism, and would not apply any constraint on introspective investigation. About
the rst point, I agree with the intrisic approach, but not necessarily with the characterization of
what exists intrinsically in general. This kind of position presents in fact severe epistemilogical
diculties which I discussed in my other paper [G20].
Here I would like to oer another point of view on this matter, with a special care for the
diculties of the second point, which I hope can shed light on how the constraint of free will
may steer introspective investigation.
It seems clear to me that from any point of view, 'I' is related to causation, for some of my
actions are not derived from my will, for instance because they fast reactions in situations when I
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do not have time to ponder on what action I should take. They way I dierenciate, from my own
point of view, these actions from the actions which derive from a decision, is causal: 'I' is not the
cause of this action, but is caused by a part of my 'extended self ' (probably a similar notion to
Damasio's protoself), which may be dened as 'what each of my experiences bears with it '. This
extended self is thus identical to 'I' in Putnam's sense, an identication which is reected in the
language: we usually designate both 'I' and my extended self by 'me'. Then if what allows this
distinction is expressible in causal terms, it is possible that the denition 'I' should also be so.
I propose the following denition: 'I' is a concept constructed as the common cause of events
which are are actually caused by an event in my extended self, for which I do identify a pragmat-
ically ultimate cause in what I designated above as the place of 'I'. I think a similar denition
may hold from another subjective point of view; however would it hold from the extrinsic point
of view ? It seems clear pragmatically that they can be identied across subjective points of
view, but it is not how this identication is done.
This denition calls for other questions, which does not necessarily presupposes the denition:
by what mechanism do I attribute the cause of a certain event to myself ? Furthermore how
to formalize precisely the notion of cause involved in the denition ? The rst question can
be investigated through the wider question of: how do I attribute causes to an event? as well
as through particular modes of the experiencing subject (including the simulation of mental
computing machines). The second one by progressive renements of the naive notion of cause in
counterexamples (dierenciating for instance the causal role of respectively reasons for a choice
and 'I'). We can also examine particular classes of mental events: for instance doe integration
event involved in the local instanciation of a mental algorithm come systematically with an
attribution of cause to 'I' ?
Beyond natural implications of the question of free will for law, there are implications of
understanding what 'freedom' is on the general form of the experiencing subject, because it
is reasonable to think that one of the fundamental desires of human beings is freedom (the
realization of which may vary for dierent 'cultures': for instance some may search for freedom
in their mental representations, others their actions in the physical world), certainly aecting
the way they think. This will for freedom may act as a constraint on introspective investigation.
I believe that being free is not about the possibility of an arbitrary choice (which would
be absolutely undetermined), or the simple possibility of a choice, for in this sense there is no
situation in which we are not free: Je peux toujours choisir, mais je dois savoir que si je ne
choisis pas, je choisis encore. - said J.-P. Sartre. It is rather about the possibility not to predict,
the possibility to hope - which is a necessity of life: without any form of hope, what reason would
there be to live ? More formally, the largest the space of seemingly reachable possibilities, the
more free we ll. And in fact we feel the most free when truely travelling, because then we are
immersed in the unknown. Locally in time, we tend to be attracted to cognitive places where
contingency is the highest. This means not only the greatest number of possible choices, but also
the most ease to switch from one to another if a certain event makes obsolete the conditions of
a rst choice.
The question is the following: how to formalize these intuitions and account for them in the
model of the experiencing subject ? Some diculties appear here: for instance, what should we
count as alternative possibilities ? (i) Do we only count actions possible in the present moment
(how to dene the present moment ?!) or do we count foreseeable possible eects in order then
to choice the appropriate action for this eect ? The reality of the relation between an action
and an eect does not matter here, and this adds up on the diculty. Furthermore, eects
may be over variable time intervals. (ii) The evaluation of ease to modify a choice aftermath is
dependant upon the situation, and relates to high level notions such as courage.
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Digression: The considerations on causation here call questions of the following kind: is it
possible for an event to have no cause ? Is it possible for an event to have an actual cause across
time ?
III.4.4  On information integration
Integrated information theory formalizes information integration in a particular way, how-
ever there are other possibilities to do so. Furthermore, this formalization is concerned mainly
with statical experiences. Here I would like to mention other ways to think about information
integration.
Integration in dynamical experiences: In particular, statical experiences have the ad-
vantage that their conceptualization is relatively stable (when well dened): in principle we can
talk about objects which appear in this conceptualization, and attempt to explain why some
patterns are object and why others are not. However we may also consider more dynamical ex-
periences and situations in which an object which was not present to the mind appears to it: we
need to develop methods to introspect on these. For that there are various types of integrations
which we should distinguish objects which are actively created and objects which are passively
perceived as such (in particular in situations in which the conceptualization of an experience or
set of experiences is simplied, structured, organized).
The second type of apparition may be related to causation: as causal relations 'direct ' the
focus of my attention from one term of the relation to the other, a pattern which is causally
stable [G20] corresponds to a pattern of attention which groups together the elements of the
pattern, as they are all active in the 'same time', which makes possible their grouping by neuronal
connections.
The rst type of apparition was mentioned already above, when multiple instanciation of
a mental algorithm result in a hard-wired version of this algorithm. In this direction, we may
think about the 'computing machine' supported by the global neuronal workspace as an 'inte-
grating machine' meant to control necessary connections between parts of the brain, and the
consequent creation of objects. We can notice here that the idea of a balance between functional
segregation and integration, rooting the formalism proposed by G.Tononi [EST94], is in a sense
realized by this integrating machine, suggesting another way to formalize it. Furthermore this
of thinking about it seems coherent with phenomena steering the relation between integration
and consciousness, such as the division of consciousness in split-brain patients, with a change in
the interpretation of the conceptualization split-brain patients's behavior as the division into two
conscious minds. In fact after brain split the integrating machine remains probably unique: only
its tape is divided into two parts, between which it may switch. However because of the brain
split, brain mechanisms involved in integration - provided their nature - are limited to one of the
two domains of the 'tape' where the machine 'head' is present, and no integration can happen
between these two domains. On the other hand the integrative capacity of the machine is left
unchanged in each of the domains. From an exterior point of view, since integration probably
appears in a similar way, the best conceptualization of the split-brain patient's behavior induces
the idea of two distinct minds (similarly to multiple personality disorders). On the other hand
this is dependant upon what we would like to call 'one mind '; while the 'tape' of the machine is
divided, the 'head' is probably not: which one denes what one mind is ?
I would like also to mention here that one way to combine and co-form the approach of
integration in causal terms and in terms of computing machines would be to evaluate the quantity
of information integration that a system structured like the dynamical we can dene out of
introspection on the structure of the experiencing subject and prove that it is higher than other
simpler systems. Also, another way to look at integration is to consider situations in which the
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mind has to ensure information separation and dis-integration: for instance when separating two
concepts which have been erroneously identied or dismantling a certain habit (in this case we
should account for the diculty of getting rid of a habit). I think that some disintegration can
be done via inhibition (in fact O.Houdé [H19] for instance has shown that inhibition is part of
human intelligence as much as the execution of complex algorithms): preventing systematically
the use of some neuronal connections expose them not to be maintained, and thus ultimately
destructed. However as for integration there might be multiple ways to approach it.
What about astrocytes? I nd surprising that these cells are not taken into account
in the theorisation of consciousness, while they have been proved to have an important role
in information processing in the brain. As a matter of fact, they have also been related to
consciousness in experimental research (see for instance [R02]): in particular they are involved
in information integration and perturbations of consciousness are correlated with perturbation
of astrocytes' dynamics. In [PF09]:
"The neuron is, computationally, a lter that converts analog to digital-like information, while
astrocytes can be described as being like a hub able to integrate patterns from around 100,000 to
140,000 synapses. They integrate excitatory inputs received from neurons connected to their
tips."
As a matter of fact, neurons can not be thought to support every information processed:
otherwise, how to dierenciate which neurons support conscious and unconscious processing ?
As a consequence it is reasonable to think that other cells matter regarding conscious experience.
Furthermore, since astrocytes can be considered as a contact point between neurons and the
remainder of the brain - through which elements used to repair neurons are received - it makes
sense to think that intruders such as marijuana should aect consciousness through disturbance
of the dynamics of astrocytes. I think it is reasonable to put forward the hypothesis that while
neurons only contain information under the form of signals and neuronal structures implement
algorithms, astrocytes realize integration between these bits of information and with mental
states, relatively to their state.
It is possible that the region of the brain called global neuronal workspace has a high concen-
tration of astrocytes which may be involved in the attribution of 'functions' to neurons close to
the 'machine head' I talked about above, in order to execute simple operations, inhibit connec-
tions between regions supporting local 'routes' while instanciating some algorithms, or attribute
this route function. The machine would act directly on astrocytes and indirectly on neurons.
III.4.5  Some other thoughts
I mentioned above the possibility to introspect on mechanisms of introspection itself. There
are at least two things to consider: the action of 'highlighting' a certain part of the conceptuali-
sation of experience (for instance a signle object), making it more 'present', and they translation
of what I perceive in me into words (wether these words consist in mathematical objects or words
of the natural language). It seems that the way it is done in the mind consists in 'projecting'
towards the area I am in some articulations of words, in a partially random way; this projection
is followed each time by the action of a mechanism which compares this articulation to the un-
conscious content of this area, until this mechanism judges the articulation close enough to this
content, at which point this closeness is signied and the search comes to an end. How is this
process realized in the brain ? More generally we could consider properties of the language and
its creation as constraints for introspective investigation.
I also believe that it would be particularly interesting to think about how the global neuronal
workspace structure may be constituted during the brain's development and what constraints
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this add on its actual structure. In other words: how does consciousness appears and grow ? My
hypothesis here (that I consider to be even more speculative than the remainder of this paper) is
that this structure is constituted in two stages: 1. centralization of information to be integrated
to a single hub with a retroaction loop checking error in the function integrating information. 2.
it is out of the development of this function that the global neuronal workspace is created, as the
amount of information to integrate becomes higher and integration delegated and hierarchized.
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